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CHAPTER I 
Section A 
"For eight years economic policy and the news about the 
economy have been dominated by inflation. The story has been 
a frustrating one. Over the period 1965 to the end of 1973 
consumer prices rose by 45 per cent, or at an average rate of 
4.8 per cent a year.... Many programs have been launched to 
stop it without durable success. Inflation seemed a Hydra-
headed monster, growing two new heads each time one was cut 
off." (Economic Report of the President, 1974, p. 21). 
The tone of the opening paragraph of the 1974 Economic 
Report of the President is indicative of the difficulties 
encountered by economic analysts in dealing with the problem 
of price level determination. Indeed the President's opening 
statement only revealed the barest outline of the problems 
actually being faced. At the time the report was issued the 
U.S. was experiencing the worst sustained peacetime inflation 
in its history. Consumer prices rose at a projected annual 
rate of nearly 13% during the first quarter of 1974 as 
compared to 4% in 1965. At the Scune time the economy which 
had been sluggish for some time appeared to be heading for a 
recession - an absolute decline in real output was predicted. 
Standard theories of price determination are incapable 
of accounting for the simultaneous presence of both these 
phenomena. 
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Money matters. Most professional economists and 
virtually all laymen would agree. The striking constancy of 
the ratio of the money stock to the level of nominal income 
has been repeatedly demonstrated. However there is 
surprisingly little agreement on the mechanism by which 
changes in nominal income are divided between changes in 
prices and real output. This "Division Problem" in its 
various forms is perhaps the single most important unsolved 
question in macro-economic theory. The failure of macro 
economists to systematically attack the division problem lies 
at the root of the inability of policy makers to understand 
the inflation mechanism and hence to conduct a rational 
monetary policy. 
There are three aspects to the present study. It is 
first necessary to develop theoretical models within which 
the Division Problem may be approached. Next it is helpful 
to obtain some qualitative and quantitative appreciation of 
the relationships being dealt with. The behavior of the 
system under various monetary control strategies will be 
investigated. Finally the results of empirical estimation of 
several of the critical relationships vill be reported. 
(There are an overwhelming number of plausible causal 
relationships among the variables which were investigated. 
Many of these hypotheses have become part of the conventional 
wisdom without any econometric foundations. Contrary to the 
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usual practice in the profession, the author feels that 
reporting of glaring nonrelationships in such cases consti­
tutes as valuable an addition to the body of knowledge as the 
reporting of regressions which resulted in significant t 
statistics.) 
Students of the art of economic analysis have not 
reached a consensus on the nature of the solution to the 
division problem. This is not to say that the problem has 
received no attention, at least in its various aspects. 
Indeed, the literature is voluminous. A brief survey of the 
principal theoretical and empirical approaches occupies the 
remainder of this chapter. This is not intended to serve as 
an exhaustive history of thought, but rather as a guide to 
the general approaches taken and to some extent as a foil 
for the succeeding analysis. The survey of empirical work 
related to the division problem will be limited to studies of 
inflation. The inadequacy of current inflation theory in a 
sense is the principal weak link in macro economic analysis. 
In economic theory the determination of real output and 
the determination of the average level of prices have 
typically been approached as separate problems. In the 
Classical system real output is determined in the real sector 
alone; quantities of all commodities supplied and demanded in 
the market place are independent of the price level. Nominal 
prices are then determined by the Quantity Equation, Mv = Py. 
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An increase in the money stock creates excess demands in the 
various commodity and factor markets driving up the average 
level of prices to a new equilibrium. It is generally 
maintained that the resulting equilibrium is identical in 
real terms, and in relative prices, to the initial one. The 
system is essentially a long run construct. Its defining 
characteristic is the neutrality of money in long run equi­
librium. 
The Keynesian system contains no rigorous theory of 
prices. Real output is determined in the commodity sector as 
a function of exogenous demand and the rate of interest. In 
the monetary sector real output, prices, and liquidity 
preference serve to determine the rate of interest. Curiously, 
prices are determined outside the system. Keynesian school 
economists maintain that levels of nominal aggregate demand in 
excess of the full employment lead to price increases. This 
system is short run in nature. A principal defining char­
acteristic here is the thesis that monetary disturbances cause 
corresponding disturbances in the real sector. 
In neither of these systems are prices and real output 
jointly determined endogenous variables. Either the level of 
real output or the price level is brought in from the outside 
to close the system. Hence with either system it is 
theoretically impossible to gain any insight into the 
mechanism of simultaneous price and output determination. 
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Construction of a simple macro model in which the level 
of prices is determined internally will b3 the first order of 
business. Milton Friedman (1970) has proposed the basic out­
line of such a model. Following this lead a simple form of 
such a model will be developed and its principal character­
istics discussed in Chapter II. In Chapter III the principles 
of dynamic optimization will be applied to specify the condi­
tions under which an optimal monetary policy may be 
formulated. Chapter IV contains the results of such an 
optimization technique applied to the model under various 
sets of initial conditions. Gradient steepest descent 
techniques are employed to discover numerical solutions to 
the various problems posed. Finally Chapter V contains some 
empirical observations on the Phillips Curve approach to 
price level determination and some empirical support for the 
price level equation employed in the final model of Chapter II-
Section B 
The Quantity Theory is perhaps the most tested proposi­
tion in economics. The positive correlation between long 
term monetary and price movements is well documented (c.f., 
Friedman, 1956b). However short run price flucuations are not 
adequately explained by corresponding monetary movements. 
Economists have been forced to resort to other explanatory 
variables. 
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Since the late 1240's economists have taken two main 
types of empirical approaches to short run price level 
determination. The oldest and most prolific of these might 
be called the Phillips tradition. Attention is focused on 
the apparent tradeoff between employment and inflation. 
There is an implicit recognition that the level of real out­
put (employment) and the behavior of prices are somehow 
jointly determined. The precise nature of ths linkage being 
sought is not well specified, unfortunately. 
In recent years on the other hand cost determined 
theories of prices, the so called New Inflation theories, 
have become popular, primarily one suspects for pragmatic 
rather than theoretical reasons. Most of the large scale 
econometric models of the U,S. economy make use of this 
approach. The linkages in these models between price and 
real output determination are somewhat weak and indirect. 
However it will be shown later that even such indirect 
linkages may give rise to models with desirable long run 
properties. 
Phillips curves have received a vast amount of attention 
in the published literature. Researchers have delighted in 
running the Phillips regression under ail conceivable varia­
tions of functional form using a large variety of variables. 
Typically the lack of imagination embodied in this approach 
is matched only by the quantity of obiter dicta generated in 
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the articles. The net result however has been a general 
confusion among economists about just what a Phillips curve 
is and hence whether "it" indeed exists. For present purposes 
a brief review of the two classic pieces of the genre will 
serve to demonstrate both the strengths and the ultimate 
theoretical sterility of this approach. 
Economists have been aware of the apparent statistical 
relationship between unemployment and the rate of change of 
prices for many years. For example Irving Fisher analyzed 
the relationship in a paper published in 1926 (see also A. J. 
Brown, 1955, and B. Hansen, 1951). The Phillips construct 
was not new. However only recently has the relationship 
received widespread attention. 
Modern interest in the apparent tradeoff between un­
employment and wage inflation stems from a 1958 article by 
A- W, Phillips (Phillips, 1958)« Using annual data for nearly 
100 years, Phillips discovered a remarkably stable inverse 
relationship between the level of unemployment and the rate 
of wage inflation. Further, deviations from this relationship 
could be explained by reference to the rate of change of un­
employment and to "cost of living" factors, particularly a 
general price index and an index of import prices. 
In his opening sentence Professor Phillips set the tone 
for this and indeed for most subsequent discussions of what 
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became known as the "Phillips Curve" relationship. "When 
demand for a commodity or service is high relative to the 
supply of it we expect the price to rise, the rate of rise 
being greater the greater the excess demand." (Phillips, 1958, 
p. 283). This suggests a partial adjustment dynamic process 
underlying the price determination mechanism. This concept 
becomes the core feature of the price adjustment sector of 
the model developed in Chapter II. If the unemployment rate 
serves as an adequate proxy for the excess supply of labor, 
two of Phillips' three propositions follow; (1) the rate of 
wage inflation is inversely related to the level of unemploy­
ment, and (2) changes in the rate of unemployment should lead 
to changes in the rate of wage inflation. Indeed should wage 
adjustment be somewhat delayed changes in the unemployment 
rate should precede changes in the rate of wage inflation. 
As a final proposition,- Phillips suggested that the rate 
of change of prices, particularly import prices, acts as a 
third causal influence on wages. In his discussion Phillips 
refers to these prices as "costs". One gets the distinct 
feeling that some modified "subsistence wage" theory underlies 
his discussion; One determinant of the money wage is the 
cost of maintaining the labor force. 
In many ways Phillips' construct is most satisfactory; 
as compared to many later discussions of the subject it is 
logical, self contained, and watertight. His article became 
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immensely popular. The scope of the research is impressive: 
The relationship holds for over 100 years through a period of 
rapid industrialization, a major war, and the Great 
Depression. 
The annual rate of wage change series was constructed 
using first central differences: The rate of change at time 
t defined as the wage index at t+1 less the index at t-1 
divided by twice the index at t. This method results in 
considerable smoothing of the wage inflation series. Smoothed 
annual data for the period 1861 to 1913 was blocked by un­
employment rate into six groups. Wage rate inflation and 
unemployment averages were taken within each group. These 
averages were then fitted to the logarithmic equation 
In (w ' /w + a) = ln(b) + cln(u) (1.1) 
where w'/w is the rate of wage change and u is the unemploy­
ment rate. Parameters b and c were obtained by least squares 
estimation; the coding factor a, necessary since w'/w is 
sometimes negative, was chosen by trial and error. The 
estimated relationship was 
w'/w = -0.9 + 9.638u"l'3*4 (1.2) 
Phillips then tested his curve against subsequent data. 
The remarkable robustness of his hypothesis may be seen in 
his plot of 1913 to 1948 data (Phillips, 1958, p. 294). 
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Included in the period are a major wartime inflation and a 
post-war contraction followed by a monetary disruption 
inspired by central bank attempts to reestablish the gold 
standard at pre-war parity with sterling. Finally the period 
includes the Great Depression of the 1930's. 
As examples of his second proposition he identified 
several subperiods which displayed the counter-clockwise 
progression of observations which have become known as "Lipsey 
Loops". In these periods falling unemployment rates were 
associated with gradually increasing rates of wage inflation 
and a plot of points above the fitted curve. Following the 
business cycle peak unemployment increased but wage inflation 
declined resulting in a plot of points below the line. 
Several observations over the data period clearly could 
not be explained by the hypothesis. In each case these were 
accompanied by sharp changes in import prices. Hence 
proposition three. 
The Phillips relationship holds up broadly under a wide 
range of circumstances. Two items however are of special 
interest. First this original discussion attempted to explain 
the rate of wags inflation, not increases in the general price 
level. There is no hint here of wage push inflation; indeed 
increases in prices lead to increases in wages in this 
construct. Second the theoretical underpinnings for this 
discussion hinge on the acceptance of the inverse of the 
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unemployment rate as an acceptable proxy for the excess demand 
for labor. 
In Phillips' original study only the first of his three 
propositions was quantified by regression techniques. In a 
1960 study Richard Lipsey attempted to close this omission. 
He began with a similar though modified form of Phillips' 
equation 
w'/w = a + b(l/U) + c(l/U)2 (1.4) 
adding in turn the rate of change of unemployment and the 
rate of change of prices, both expressed in first central 
differences as in the Phillips study. Phillips' wage series 
was modified slightly also. 
On 1862 to 1913 data he obtained the relationship 
w'/w = -1.42 + 7.06 (1/U) + 2.31(1/U)2 (1.5) 
The graph of this relationship is very close to that of the 
original Phillips equation. 
Adding the rate of change of U gave 
w'/w = -1.52 + 7.60 (1/U) + 1.61(1/0)2 _ o.23(U'/U) (1.6) 
Phillips' suggestion that the rate of wage inflation 
would be unaffected by any rate of price inflation less than 
the expected rate of wage inflation was rejected by Lipsey. 
He could find no justification for such an asymmetrical 
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structure. Estimation of the relationship 
w'/w = a + b{l/U) + c(l/U)2 + d(U'/U) + e(P'/P) (1.7) 
gave 
w'/w = -1.21 + 6.45(1/U) + 2.26(1/U) 2 
-0.019(U'/U) + 0.21(P'/P) (1.8) 
suggesting a significant positive relationship between the 
rate of price inflation and the rate of wage inflation. Re-
estimating a modification of this equation on post World War 
I data, 1923 to 1939 and 1948 to 1957, gave 
(Note: The practice of placing standard errors in 
parentheses beneath the associated parameter estimates will 
be followed whenever possible. Standard errors were not 
always reported in early econometric work, unfortunately.) 
The sign of the U'/U coefficient has changed; it would appear 
that the loops have changed direction, from a counter-clockwise 
to a clockwise progression. Since the size of the P'/P 
coefficient increased rather sharply, Lipsey concluded that 
there seemed to be even more rapid adjustment in wages to 
w'/w = 0.47 + 0.43(1/U) + 11.18(1/U)4 
(2.10) (6.00) 
+ 0.038 (U'/U) + 0.69(P'/P) 
(0.012) (0.08) 
(1.9) 
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price increases in the post World War I period than prior to 
World War I. Indeed by far the most important explanatory 
variable in Equation 1.9 is the price inflation variable. 
Wages and prices are highly correlated; hence price movements 
tend to dominate the relationship. 
Lipsey's theoretical model was perhaps the most innovative 
aspect of the study. His model seems to have been the first 
explicit attempt to provide some explanation of the micro-
economic foundations underlying the observed macro-economic 
phenomena. 
"We now introduce the dynamic hypothesis that the rate 
at which w (micro wage level) changes is related to excess 
demand, and specifically, the greater is the proportionate 
disequilibrium the more rapidly will wages be changed" (Lipsey, 
1960, p. 13). Various aspects of this question have been 
actively pursued by other economists. 
For present purposes the import of the Lipsey paper is 
threefold. First it provides additional empirical support 
for Phillips' three original propositions; The rate of wage 
inflation is dependent on (1) the rate of unemployment, 
(2) changes in the rate of unemployment, and (3) the cost of 
living. Second the paper contains an early theoretical 
attempt to provide a micro-economic foundation to the 
observed trade-off phenomenon. However Lipsey's final set of 
regressions, summarized by Equation 1.9 above, suggests the 
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most important contribution of the study. By far the most 
important explanatory variable in this regression is the price 
inflation rate variable. Lipsey's circumspect discussion of 
these results suggests a recognition that the relationship 
may be open to a variety of interpretations. The most 
obvious is that the wage rate is just another price. Prices 
then are determined in an autoregressive fashion influenced 
only slightly by the unemployment rate. Nonetheless Lipsey 
chose to retain the Phillips thesis that increases in the 
general price level "cause" changes in the wage rate. Most 
subsequent analysts have chosen to follow his lead. 
The body of Classical economic theory suggests a 
slightly different interpretation. The usual general equi­
librium formulation of this system is homogeneous in nominal 
wages and prices. Quantities demanded and supplied depend on 
relative prices alone= The absolute price level must be 
determined from the outside. One might easily append to this 
a system of adjustment equations by which relative prices 
adjust gradually in response to nonzero levels of excess 
demand. In such a system the rate of change of real wages, 
that is the rate of change of money wages less the rate of 
price inflation, would depend on the excess demand for labor. 
Transposing the last term of Equation 1.9 to the left hand 
side gives an equation similar to the model above. The left 
hand side is, almost, the rate of change of real wages. One 
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might suggest that the unemployment rate provides a rough 
proxy for the excess demand for labor; when it is below 
normal and falling, excess demand is probably positive; when 
it is unusually high and rising, excess demand is negative. 
Thus we would expect to observe that increases in real wages 
occur during periods when the unemployment is low and falling 
and vice versa. 
In the econometric search for a theory of price deter­
mination, however, such an approach has not been particularly 
popular. 
The second major econometric approach to price level 
determination has become known as the New Inflation Theory. 
During the years of creeping inflation of the 1950's many 
economists came to accept a cost determined theory of the 
aggregate price level. This approach found expression in a 
large number of sectorial studies tending to support the 
thesis. Furthermore, a cost-push theory of price level 
changes came to be built into virtually all of the large scale 
quarterly U.S. econometric models developed during the 1960's. 
For once economists developed a theory of prices which cor­
responded to the layman's explanation^ 
The revival of a cost theory of the aggregate price 
level received an early formal treatment at the hands of 
Willard Thorp and Richard Quandt in The New Inflation (1959). 
The basic elements of the New Inflation theory are quite 
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simple. Cost increases are promulgated continually by 
various economic pressure groups attempting to better their 
positions vis-a-vis other groups through increased money 
incomes. These inflationary pressures together with public 
concern for the maintenance of low levels of unemployment and 
high rates of economic growth increase the probability that 
any increases in the general price level will be validated by 
Monetary and Fiscal policy actions. There is no direct con­
flict between the New Inflation theory and more traditional 
Monetary or Keynesian theories. The theory thus does not deny 
that cost-push may involve coincident increases in the money 
stock, fiscal expenditures and nominal income, particularly if 
real output is not allowed to decline. There is however a 
shift of the proximate causal factor from actions taken in the 
public sector to the institutional structure of the private 
sector. Hence public policy prescriptions which result from 
such a theory tend to stress programs designed to promote 
competition, increase labor mobility, and so on, and to de-
emphasize monetary and fiscal actions aimed only at affecting 
the level of aggregate demand. 
There are several difficulties with, a cost determined 
theory of price changes. It is, simply put, not a very 
elegant theory. Prices rise because prices rise. There is a 
definite risk of circularity in such an argument. It is a 
theory more of the mechemism through vAiich price changes are 
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transmitted throughout the economy than of the cause of price 
changes. At best, cost push theory is a theory of autonomous, 
price changes. However when attempts are made to interpret 
it as a theory of causation, the result, all too often, is a 
boogy-man price theory: Price increases result from 
"unwarrented" union wage demands; oil company "profiteering"; 
et cetera. If these charges are true, strict antitrust policy 
and wage and price controls could stop such inflationary 
pressures easily. Finally in the context of a cost push price 
theory the causal linkages between the factors affecting price 
and real output determination are somewhat indistinct. Thus 
it is difficult to integrate such a theory with, say, a 
standard Keynesian formulation. 
In spite of these shortcomings it has become the dominant 
theory of price level determination. A goodly amount of 
empirical support has been mustered in support of the thesis. 
A variety of approaches have been used to estimate cost 
push components of inflation. Wage push inflation is 
typically established by comparing the rate of change of 
money wages with the rate of change of labor productivity. 
It is assumed that any increases in wages not matched by 
productivity increases is inflationary. Such tests are 
simple to make, however they deal only with money wage 
movements, not with real wages* the proper variable in such a 
construct. There exist a plethora of such studies. 
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Phelps (1961) has suggested analysis of the distribution 
of relative income shares would provide an appropriate test 
between cost and demand caused inflation. An increase in 
wages, relative to profits he argues would imply cost push 
inflation. Such an approach arises from a view of profits as 
a residual, not a cost. Neither of these approaches directly 
answers the question of how cost increases affect the general 
level of prices. 
This question has been attacked by input-output analysis. 
It is in principle possible to trace the results of a cost 
increase occurring in one sector throughout the rest of the 
economy by using an input-output table (see for example 
Eckstein and Froiran, 1959). Such an exercise must assume all 
price increases are passed on in their entirety, and that no 
substitution takes place either during the intermediate pro­
duction or final consumption stages. 
The cost push approach of the New Inflation theorists 
became embodied in the major quarterly econometric models of 
the U.S. economy developed during the 1960's.^ Each of these 
models contains a detailed financial sector. Linkages between 
this sector and the real sector are neo-Keynesian in 
review of the financial sectors of nine quarterly 
econometric models may be found in Carl Christ, 1971. The 
models he considered include the Warton Model (1967), the OEB 
Model (1966), the 1968 Michigan Model C1969), and various ver­
sions of both the Brookings Model and the FRB-MIT Models, 
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character with emphasis placed on the function of interest 
rates in the transmission mechanism. Prices are determined 
primarily by factor costs (wages, agricultural prices, import 
prices), secondarily by the general level of business 
activity (unemployment, capacity utilization, unfilled orders), 
together with a variable markup factor designed to capture 
trend, taxes, and so on. 
Thus by the late I960*s the manifest "official" theory 
of the monetary sector consisted of a markup theory of prices 
and a financial sector - real sector linkage based on market 
rates of interest. The performance of this "official" theory 
in subsequent years was something less than exemplary. 
Beginning in the last half of the 1960's, roughly 
coincident with the escalation of the Viet Nam war, and 
continuing well into the 1970's there was an apparent failure 
of monetary stabilization policy to curb inflation. High and 
rising market rates of interest were interpreted as indicators 
of a tight monetary policy by policy makers and model 
builders alike. 
However econometric forecasts tended to understate 
levels of real output eventually realized. Meanwhile the 
money stock grew at an unprecidented rate. Gradually the 
rate of inflation rose to record levels. 
It is the purpose of succeeding chapters to set forth a 
theory of price level emd real output determination in which 
20 
changes in these aggregates result from internal, endogenous 
forces. Next within the context of such models the effects 
of various types of monetary and fiscal policies will be 
analyzed. 
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CHAPTER II 
As a point of departure for later discussions consider 
the simplified aggregate macro economic model proposed by 
Milton Friedman (1970) for a closed economy with no government 
sector. Interpretation of the model is basically due to 
Friedman but differs however in some minor respects. The 
Friedman Model: a static equilibrium model 
C/P = f(Y/P,R) (2.1) 
I/P = g(R) (2.2) 
Y/P = C/P + I/P (2.3) 
MD = P 1(Y/P,R) (2.4) 
MS = k(R) (2.5) 
MD = MS (2.6) 
The first three equations describe relationships in the 
real sector of the economy; the last three define the 
behavior of the monetary sector. The two sectors are linked 
by the rate of interest and nominal income. The model as 
specified is under determined; there are seven unknowns (C, 
P, Y, R, I, MD, MS) and only six equations. Note that Y/P 
has been used for real income in the equations defining the 
model. A real income variable, y, is used later as a 
separate variable; the defining relationship y = Y/P is then 
counted as an independent equation. One additional relation­
ship must be postulated among the variables to determine the 
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solution. For simplicity a number of important economic 
variables have been ignored, wealth, the capital stock, etc. 
Their inclusion would not change the basic nature of the 
argument which follows. 
Equation 2.1 expresses the relationship between the real 
level of consumption demand on the one hand and real income 
and interest rates on the other. We may quite properly extend 
this to include all induced income dependent components of 
aggregate demand. 
Equation 2.2, Keynes marginal efficiency of investment 
schedule, expresses the relationship between real investment 
demand and the rate of interest. Again we may extend this 
definition to include all components of demand which are 
interest elastic but independent of current income levels. 
The income identity. Equation 2.3, defines an additivity 
requirement on the various endogenous components of the model. 
In this model there can be no distinction between desired and 
actual production or consumption decisions. Note also that 
the aggregate supply function has been suppressed here; 
t 
supply is demand determined. 
The "quantity theory" or "liquidity preference" Equation 
2.4 expresses the relation between desired money balances, 
prices, income, and the rate of interest. One defining 
distinction between those who call themselves Keynesians and 
those who call themselves Monetarists has often been their 
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respective assumptions concerning the interest elasticity of 
money demand. The right hand side of this equation is assumed 
homogeneous of degree 1 in the price level. 
Equation 2.5 is the money supply function. Money supply 
could be made exogenous if desired. This would reduce the 
model by one equation and one unknown. Finally Equation 2.6 
defines equilibrium in the money market. 
One further relationship must be specified to make the 
system solvable. In the naive quantity theory the added 
equation is 
Y/P = y^, exogenous (2.7) 
Real income is determined outside the system by the Walrasian, 
full employment, general equilibrium process. Changes in the 
money stock thus serve only to change the level of prices. 
On the other hand in the naive income-expenditure theory 
the price level is determined outside the system. 
P = Pg, exogenous (2.8) 
This approach leads to the familiar IS - LM analysis 
in which the first three equations serve to define the 
set of conditions necessary for equilibrium in the real 
sector; the last three define these conditions for the 
monetary sector. The two sectors together determine the 
joint solution for all variables. 
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In either case the model is clearly an equilibrium 
construct. One interpretation is that it requires instanta­
neous adjustment by all variables from one equilibrium to 
another. The equilibria so reached are static unchanging 
levels of incomes, interest rates, and so on. The model 
ignores adjustment lags, expectations, unrealized desires and 
all other obvious attributes of the dynamic "real world". 
Economists of one persuasion or the other typically interpret 
their opponents' models in such a fashion. 
The more charitable interpretation however is that such 
a model is truly comparative static in nature. It is assumed 
that underlying the model is a dynamic structure with 
stability properties such that the system will indeed tend to 
progress from one equilibrium toward the next in an orderly 
fashion and within a time frame short enough to make the 
comparison of the equilibria economically meaningful. 
For many questions comparative static analysis is a 
proper and useful tool. It should be clear however that it 
cannot be used to answer essentially dynamic questions. The 
investigation of the process by which a change in nominal 
income is divided between real and price effects is clearly 
such a problem. Due to lags in the dynamic adjustment 
process, policies designed to affect real output in one 
period may in fact affect both prices and output in sub­
sequent periods. For stabilization policy both current and 
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future effects are of critical interest. The static model 
must be modified to deal with these effects explicitly. 
In recognition of this fundamental difficulty Milton 
Friedman has suggested (Friedman, 1970) the following dynamic 
approach to the problem of division. 
dP 
dt = #. r ' r ' - -*] (2.9) 
(2.10) 
Where asterisks indicate anticipated values and lower case y 
is real income, Y/P. The system must be consistent at each 
point in time with the identity 
Y = Py, (2.11) 
This implies the rate of change identity 
Y'/Y = P'/P + y'/y (2,12) 
As an illustration he suggests the relationships 
d log P d log P* fd log Y d log Y*] 
dt = dt + «[ 3t 3t J 
+ Y (log y - log y*) (2.13) 
dj|p. , a log + (i_a) d log Y _ d log Y* 
dt dt 
- y(log y - log y*) (2.14) 
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The rate of change of prices is dependent on the anticipated 
price change, the discrepancy between actual and anticipated 
rates of growth of nominal income and the logarithm of the 
ratio of actual to anticipated real income. Similarly the 
rate of change of real income depends on its anticipated rate 
of change adjusted as before for any discrepancy between 
actual and anticipated rates of change of nominal income and 
actual and anticipated levels of real income. Equations 2.13 
and 2.14 sum to 2.12. 
Thus Friedman has added three dynamic relationships 
2.12, 2.13, and 2.14 to the system. Ignoring the starred 
variables for the moment, it would appear at first glance 
that the system is now over determined. The static model, 
including y as a variable and the decomposition equation 
y = Y/P as an equation, contains 8 unknowns and 7 independent 
equations, and hence has one degree of freedom. Only one 
additional independent relationship may be added to close the 
model. Note however that 2.12 is not independent of 2,11, 
but is simply the dynamic analogue. Further, by construction 
2.13 and 2.14 add up to 2.12, a linear dependence. The three 
dynamic equations provide only a single relationship 
independent of the original model. Therefore, still ignoring 
the starred variables, the system now has 8 unknowns and 8 
independent equations (2.1 through 2.6, 2.11, and either 2.13 
or 2.14). 
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In addition there are three "anticipation" variables 
(Y*, P*, y*). Jumping ahead, these are defined by Equations 
2.15, 2.17, 2»18, 2.19. These four equations contain three 
independent relationships by construction. These relation­
ships may be differentiated to obtain the dynamic analogues; 
however as before, in Equations 2.11 and 2.12, this does not 
provide any new information. The anticipation subsystem thus 
contains 3 unknowns and 3 independent relationships, and is 
completely determined. Hence the rationale of the previous 
paragraph was not destroyed by ignoring these variables. The 
complete system now contains 11 unknowns and 11 independent 
relationships. 
The anticipation variables are linked by the identity 
It is of interest to postulate a relationship between the 
anticipated levels of these variables and observed past levels 
of economic activity. It is often suggested that a weighted 
average of past levels of actual income may serve as a proxy 
for anticipated, or permanent income. 
Y* = P*y* (2.15) 
declining weight structure 
w(T) = We"G(t-T) 6 > 0 
T  E  [ t-0, t ]  (2.16) 
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with W chosen such that 
t 
/ w{T)dT = 1 
t-6 
Thus W = 6/1-e where 6 is the length of time over which 
expectations are formed and the parameter 6 determines the 
shape of the weight structure: The larger the value of 6 the 
greater is the weight placed on more recent experience. Thus 
t 
Y* = J w, (T)Y(T)dT (2,17) 
^ t-e^ ^ 
P* = / w,(T)P(T)dT (2.18) 
t-Sj 
yf = / Wo(T)y{T)dT (2.19) 
t-ej 
where 
-6.(t-x) 
and 
^rer ® 
1-e ^ ^ 
Y*(t) = P*(t)y*(t) 
Friedman assumes, Equation 2.11, that nominal income is 
divisible into the product of its component indices, price and 
real output. In a similar vein we have suggested a similar 
relationship for a rational system of expectations. Equation 
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2,15. For this identity to be satisfied at all points 
y * i / Y *  - P*«/P* + y'Vy* (2.20) 
where . 
/ w^(t) Y ' { T ) d T  
Y*' ^~^1 
= -Tg-
/  W ,  ( T)Y( T ) d T  
t-9. 
However Equation 2.21 may be decomposed by reference to 
identity 2.15 ^ 
/ w, (P'y + Py' )dt 
Y*' t-9^ 
(2.21) 
Y^ Y* 
which must equal the RHS of 2.20. Thus 
t 
f w,P' y d T  + / w,P y ' d T  
t-8^ ^ t-0^ 
= y* / w-P' d T  + P* / w^y' d x  (2.22) 
t-e, t-83 
A relationship which must hold at all points. 
Consider y' = û over an interval long enough that y* = y. 
Then 2.22 reduces to 
/  w , P ' d T  =  /  w ^ P ' d T  
t-Si t-62 
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For this to hold over all possible time paths of p' this must 
be an identity. Hence 8^^ = Gg and Wj^(t) e Wgfz). By a 
similar argument 8^ = 6g and = w^Ct). 
Thus we arrive at a necessary requirement for the 
consistency of such a system of expectation formulation: 
Expectations about nominal income, prices, and real income, 
when based on geometrically weighted averages of past 
observations, must be formed in an identical manner if these 
expectations are to satisfy the identity Y* = P*y*. By a 
similar method of proof an identical requirement exists for 
other strategies of expectation formation. It is important 
to note that this precludes interpretation of y* as the level 
of long run full employment real output. It will be shown 
later in this chapter that reference to such a full employment 
benchmark is necessary to force long run money neutrality and 
complete price adjustment in a model such as this. 
The partially reduced form of the static system may be 
expressed as a single equation containing any three of the 
eight variables of the static subsystem. Since the focus 
here is on the effects of monetary policy the system may be 
solved in terras of the observable variables Y, P, and ri. 
This is the approach taken in Equation 2.29. Alternatively, 
making use of the decomposition identity Y = Py, we may solve 
for real income y in terms of P and M. Any such equation 
will be referred to as a static equilibrium condition. 
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Similarly, using the remaining equations of the model, 
one may arrive at a partially reduced dynamic equation 
defining the division mechanism. For example using 2.13 as a 
starting point 
t 
/ wP'dx 
P' t-0 
P t 
f wPdx 
t-e 
+ r - " t 
/ wY'dx 
t-6 
f wYdx 
t-e 
+ Y &n Y - Y &n 
P 
t t 
/ wYdx / wPdx 
t—8 [t-e 
(2.23) 
These two equations, one defining static, period by 
period equilibrium, the other defining period to period 
adjustment, are sufficient to completely determine the future 
behavior of the system. 
To facilitate this discussion we will consider the 
following simplified version of the general macro model 
developed thus far. A simple explicit version of the model 
will be used in subsequent discussions. The money supply 
Equation 2,5 will be changed to make the money stock exogenous, 
The central bank determines the nominal stock of money while 
the real value of this stock and the terms under which it is 
held are determined in the private sector. Thus the system 
is one which can be controlled by monetary policy alone. It 
is the purpose of the next chapter to investigate various 
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schemes of the monetary control of such a system. Further 
the system will be described by difference rather than dif­
ferential equations for computational simplicity. 
Equilibrium in the commodity sector is described by 
three equations. 
Y = C + I (2.24) 
C = b^y 
I = P • b^ • r EI 
0 < b_ < 1 
c 
EI < 0 
(2.25) 
( 2 . 2 6 )  
If desired these may be solved for the Hicksian IS curve 
r = 
1-b. EI (2.27) 
Money market equilibrium is defined by the equation, Hick's 
LM curve. 
M bw = Y EM > 0 ( 2 . 2 8 )  
The money stock is viewed as an exogenous control variable. 
One may solve for nominal income in terms of the price level 
and the stock of money^ 
Let 
A = b 
EI 
EI-EM 
-EM 
EI-EM 
M 1-b. 
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Then 
-EM EI 
Y = A • pEI-EM . j^EI-EM (2.29) 
The system is homogeneous of degree 0 in nominal income, 
prices, and the money stock. 
-EM EI -EM EI 
Y = X . A • pEI-BM . (X.p)EI-EM . 
Differentiating the logarithm of Equation 2.29 gives 
Y' _ -EM . P' . EI . M' 
Y EI-EM P EI-EM M (2.30) 
Note that in general the rate of growth of nominal income is 
not expected to equal the rate of growth of the money stock. 
This is due to the fact that changes in M not matched by 
proportionate price changes lead to changes in money market 
interest rates and hence to changes in the income velocity of 
money. However if the interest elasticity of money demand, 
-EM, is zero, velocity is constant and Y'/Y always equals 
M'/M. In such a case the system displays the so called 
Classical Dicotomy with the interest rate determined solely 
in the real sector= 
If an arbitrary set of values is chosen for the 
parameters of the system, the response of the system through 
time may be observed for various growth rates of the money 
stock. Table 1 contains the results of such an exercise for 
a system with a constant price level and a rate of money stock 
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Table 2.1. The static model with increasing money stock (An 
arbitrary set of parameter values was selected for 
use in all simulations used in this study. Values 
of these parameters may be found in Appendix A.) 
c I V y %AY R 
194.704 21.634 2.16 216.337 6.24 
198.579 22.064 2.14 220.643 1.990 5.94 
202.531 22.503 2.12 225.034 1.990 5.65 
206.561 22.951 2.10 229.512 1.990 5.38 
210.672 23.408 2.08 234.080 1.990 5.12 
214.865 23.874 2.06 238.738 1.990 4.88 
219.141 24.349 2.04 243.490 1.990 4.64 
223.502 24.834 2.02 248.335 1.990 4.42 
227.950 25.328 2.00 253.278 1.990 4.21 
232.436 25.832 1.98 258.318 1.990 4.01 
237.113 26.346 1.96 263.453 1.990 3.81 
241.832 26.870 1.94 268.702 1.990 3.63 
246.645 27.405 1.92 274.050 1.990 3.46 
251.553 27.950 1.90 279.504 1.990 3.29 
256.560 28.507 1.88 285.066 1.990 3.13 
261.665 29.074 1.87 290.739 1.990 2.98 
266.873 29.653 1.85 296.526 1.990 2.34 
272.184 30.243 1.83 302.427 1.990 2.70 
277.601 30.845 1.81 308.445 1.990 2.57 
283.126 31.458 1.79 314.584 1.990 2.45 
growth, RM, of 3%. A listing of parameter values used in 
this and all subsequent simulations may be found in Appendix A. 
The standard Income Expenditure model is explicitly a 
short run formulation. Its implicit policy implications 
provide a general theoretical guide for the appropriate 
conduct of short period monetary policy. However the model 
is not well suited for discussion and analysis of long term 
monetary policy for a growing economy. Its principal 
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shortcoming lies in the nature of the investment function, 
the equation governing the behavior of the income-independent 
components of aggregate demand. 
It is evident from Table 1 that a steady rate of 
monetary growth leads to a steady rate of growth of real 
income. This increase is effected however by a decline in 
the rate of interest. Only a decline in the interest rate 
can induce the increase in the level of investment demand 
necessary to match increased savings which results from 
income growth. At the same time interest rate declines 
induce a secular decrease in the velocity of money corre­
sponding to the reduced opportunity cost of holding money 
balances• 
In a growing economy one might expect to observe a 
secular increase in real investment through time if interest 
rates remain constant, reflecting the desire to devote a 
constant proportion of an ever increasing real output to 
capital accumulation. To allow for this possibility formally 
the investment function may be altered slightly. Assume a 
secular increase in real income at a constant rate, RYf. 
Replace Equation 2.26 by 
t 
I = P • b^. • n {(1 + RBI.).(1 + RYf)}r** (2.31) 
^ i=l ^ 
îtor ths anoment let = 0 for ail î; this factor will îse 
considered later, SxogenoEs real investsnent grows at a rate 
2Yf for any fixed level of the interest rate. For convenience 
this will be referred to as the "natiiral " rate of investment 
growth. At any particular point in tine marginal investment 
activities are inversely related to interest rate. Ihrongh 
this mechanism monetary policy is capable of influencing the 
ratio of investment to real output. A simulation of the 
model with this modification is provided in Table 2. The 
static equilibria™ condition with this modification becomes 
-EM -EM EI 
Y = a{b n [{1 + RBI.) (1 + RYf)]}BI-EM p EI-EM EI-EM 
r. X i X. z. 
where 
-EM 
a = bM 
l-bc 
(2.32) 
Note that with constant prices if the money stock grows at 
rate RM equal to RYf, the rate of exogenous demand increase, 
nominal income will also grow at rate RM. The system will be 
stationary in the sense that velocity and interest rates will 
be constant through time» 
With this modification a constant rate of monetary 
growth at 3%, the natural rate of investment growth, yields a 
constant rate of real income increase at 3%, with constant 
velocity and interest rates. These results are somewhat more 
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Table 2.2. The static model with Friedman Rule 1 monetary 
growth (RBI^ = 0, , RYf = .03, RM = . 03) 
C I V Y %AY R 
194.704 21.634 2.16 216.337 6.24 
200.545 22.283 2.16 222.823 3.000 6.24 
206.561 22.951 2.16 229.512 3.000 6.24 
212.758 23.640 2.16 236.398 3.000 6.24 
219.141 24.349 2.16 243.490 3.000 6.24 
225.715 25.079 2.16 250.794 3.000 6.24 
232.436 25.832 2.16 258.318 3.000 6.24 
239.461 26.607 2.16 266.06 8 3.000 6.24 
246.645 27.405 2.16 274.050 3.000 6.24 
254.044 28.227 2.16 282.271 3.000 6.24 
251.665 29.074 2.16 290.739 3.000 6.24 
269.515 29.946 2.16 299.462 3.000 6.24 
277.601 30.845 2.16 308.445 3.000 6.24 
285.929 31.770 2.16 317.699 3.000 6.24 
294.507 32.723 2.16 327.230 3.000 6.24 
303.342 33.705 2.16 337.047 3.000 6.24 
312.442 34.716 2.16 347.158 3.000 6.24 
321.816 35.757 2.16 357.573 3.000 6.24 
331.470 36.830 2.16 368.300 3.000 6.24 
341.414 37.935 2.16 379.349 3.000 6.24 
appealing intuitively. 
We may now define RBI^ as the cyclically varying component 
of demand and let RYf represent the long term growth rate of 
the economy. With this modification the period equilibrium 
sector of the model may be dealt with either as a description 
of a stationary or a growing economy by varying the rate of 
long term growth RYf. Further business cycles could be 
generated by varying RBI^ through time. This represents, 
ceteris paribus, a cyclic variation in the proportion of real 
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output which is channeled into investment activities as well 
as any other cyclic compents of exogenous demand. Finally by 
dividing the period reduced form equation by (1 + RYf), where 
RYf is the full employment or long term trend rate of growth 
of the economy, it is possible to isolate the cyclic behavior 
of the economy from its long term trend behavior and to 
analyze the cyclic behavior of a growing economy as though 
it were a no growth system. 
The reduced form adjustment equation, 2,23, can be dealt 
with most conveniently with a difference equation approxi­
mation. Expectations about the future are assumed to be 
based primarily on current period expectations modified in 
light of actual current developments. A simple form of such 
a mechanism is 
Tp. 
n = p;_i t-i 
Pt-2 
Future expectations are formed by simple extrapolation of 
current expectations. 
Unfortunately such a simple formulation causes the rate 
of change of expectations to equal the lagged observed rate 
of change of the variable in question; if prices are constant 
through time, expected price is constant also—even if 
expected and actual prices are not equal. 
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To avoid this possibility a learning factor term may be 
introduced to gradually force these terms together in such a 
situation. Thus the expectation equations become 
n = P&-1 
^t = ?t-i 
^t-1 ^t-1 EW 
rt-2j N-iJ 
f?t_i' K-i EW 
?t-2 Tf-l 
(2.33) 
If N EW < 1 
The last two terms of Friedman's price adjustment 
equation, 2.23, serve as an accelerator dependent on devia­
tions between actual real income and anticipated real income. 
Because of their peculiar form we will ignore them for the 
present. The remainder of that equation is merely the 
derivative of a power function in P*, Y, and Y*, that is 
Pt = pj 
EA 
(2.34) 
Similarly 
Yt = y; 
i-SA 
and 
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Current price is responsive to monetary policy only indirectly 
through the relationship between the money stock and nominal 
income, the static equilibrium condition, 2,32. 
Simultaneous solution of 2.32 and 2.34 yields 
n = n-i 
pt-i 
Pt-2 
lEW 
t-1 
^t = %f-l 
't-1 
^t-2 
't-1 
EW 
EI-EM EI-EM p* EI-EM EA'EI 
P_ = (a^A) ° .{b^' n(l+RBI.)(1+RYf)}° • —° ° 
i=l ?t 
EA 
EI-EA -EM 
Y. = a " n (l+RBI J (1+RYf) } • 
^ ^ i=l 1 EA 
-EM 
D M 
EI 
D (2.35) 
where 
EI 
a — b EI-EM M 
—EM 
1 EI-EM 
l-b_ 
D = EI - (1 - EA) EM 
As an empirical observation the price level does not 
appear to be significantly influenced by current monetary 
policy. Indeed the evidence suggests that price movements 
are largely auto generating in nature. Accordingly the model 
is not damaged theoretically by modifying the system still 
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further by lagging the income accelerator term in the price 
Equation 2.34. This simplifies computation appreciably by 
introducing a degree of recursiveness into the model. Thus 
^ = n 't-1 
EA 
(2.36) 
This leads to the modified set of recursive equations 
EW 
n = Pt-i 
?t-i 
fvll K-ii 
*t-2. 
I—1 1 
*
+J 
fVi fVi] 
i?t-2. 
EW 
= Pt 
't-1 
EA 
-EM -EM EI 
= a.{b,. Ml4.RBI,)(l+RYf)}^"-™.P. M.s:-™ 
t I i^l 1 t t 
(2.37) 
These may be solved sequentially. 
The model was simulated under both formulations with no 
qualitative differences in behavior save for a slight 
extension of the price adjustment lags. A simulation of the 
model over 30 periods is provided in Table 3. Exogenous 
demand w as allowed t o  grow at 3%. M  was increased a t  3%, 6 % ,  
Table 2.3. Behavior of the Friedman model in a growing economy 
Y/P Y %AY p %AP Y* P* M V R 
216.34 216. 34 0. 0000 1. 0000 0.000 216. 34 1. 0000 100. 00 2 .16 6. 24 
222.83 222, 83 3. 0000 1. 0000 0.000 222. 83 1. 0000 103. 00 2 .16 6. 24 
229.51 229. 51 3. 0000 1. 0000 0.000 229. 51 1. 0000 106. 09 2 .16 6. 24 
236.40 236. 40 3. 0000 1. 0000 0.000 236. 40 1. 0000 109. 27 2 .16 6. 24 
243.49 243. 49 3. 0000 1. 0000 0.000 243. 49 1, 0000 112. 55 2 .16 6. 24 
255.64 255. 64 4. 9904 1. 0000 0.000 250. 79 1. 0000 119. 30 2 .14 5. 95 
267,37 268. 91 5. 1915 1, 0058 0.575 263. 81 1. 0000 126. 46 2 .13 5. 73 
279.54 282. 93 5. 2117 1. 0121 0.633 278. 04 1. 0063 134. 05 2 .11 5. 52 
292.24 297. 68 5. 2137 1, 0186 0.639 293. 04 1. 0133 142. 09 2 .09 5. 31 
305.53 313. 20 5. 2139 1. 0251 0.639 308. 81 1. 0203 150. 62 2 .08 5. 12 
309.29 319. 08 1. 8787 1. 0317 0,639 325. 37 1. 0273 152. 12 2 .10 5. 35 
315.12 324. 03 1. 5511 1. 0283 -0.327 330. 83 1. 0343 153. 65 2 .11 5. 49 
321.26 328. 95 1. 5184 1. 0239 -0,424 335. 27 1. 0303 155. 18 2 .12 5. 64 
327.55 333. 94 1. 5151 1. 0195 -0.433 339. 71 1. 0253 156. 73 2 .13 5. 78 
333.97 338. 99 1. 5148 1. 0151 -0.434 344. 27 1. 0203 158. 30 2 .14 5. 93 
347.22 350. 91 3. 5151 1. 0106 -0.434 348. 94 1. 0153 164. 63 2 .13 5. 79 
359.58 363, 95 3. 7173 1. 0122 0.149 361. 41 1. 0104 171. 22 2 .13 5. 72 
372.25 377. 56 3. 7375 1. 0143 0.208 375. 11 1. 0121 178. 07 2 .12 5. 64 
385.34 391. 68 3. 7396 1. 0164 0.214 389. 38 1. 0145 185. 19 2 .11 5. 57 
398.90 406. 32 3. 7398 1. 0186 0.214 404. 18 1. 0168 192. 60 2 .11 5. 50 
410.28 418. 81 3. 0737 1. 0208 0.214 419. 52 1. 0192 198. 38 2 .11 5. 52 
422.53 431. 41 3. 0073 1. 0210 0.021 432. 34 1. 0215 204. 33 2 .11 5. 53 
435.20 444. 35 3. 0007 1. 0210 0.002 445. 25 1. 0217 210. 46 2 .11 5. 53 
448.25 457, 68 3. 0000 1. 0210 0.000 458. 51 1. 0217 216. 77 2 .11 5. 53 
461.70 471. 41 3. 0000 1. 0210 0.000 472. 18 1. 0216 223. 27 2 .11 5. 53 
475.55 485. 56 3. 0000 1. 0210 0.000 486. 27 1. 0215 229. 97 2 .11 5. 53 
489.82 500. 12 3. 0000 1. 0210 0.000 500. 78 1. 0215 236. 87 2 .11 5. 53 
504.51 515. 13 3. 0000 1. 0210 0.000 515. 74 1. 0214 243. 98 2 .11 5. 53 
519.65 530. 58 3. 0000 1. 0210 0.000 531. 15 1. 0214 251. 30 2 .11 5. 53 
535.24 546. 50 3. 0000 1. 0210 0.000 547. 02 1. 0214 258. 84 2 .11 5. 53 
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1%, and 4% for five periods each, then at 3% for the remaining 
10 periods. Initial conditions consistent with a constant 
price level and fulfilled expectations were specified. 
The model has a number of important stability properties. 
Qualitative behavior of the system was not altered in 
simulations undertaken with a variety of different parameter 
values — so long as each of the exponential parameters in the 
adjustment equations was chosen between zero and one. When­
ever the rate of monetary growth is set equal to the rate of 
increase of exogenous demand the model stabilizes at a 
constant rate of growth of real output and prices. However 
this constant rate of growth of prices need not always be 
zero; if it is nonzero, velocity and interest rates will not 
be constant through time. Real output will decline to 
compensate for price increases. 
The system is theoretically perverse. One of the 
principal tenets of the monetary theorists is that in the 
long run monetary movements have no influence on the real 
sector. In this model with a constant rate of interest real 
output grows at the same rate as exogenous demand. With 
monetary growth at this rate prices should adjust to a 
constant level. 
In some cases they do. Even in such cases however the 
burden of adjustment to a monetary disturbance does not fall 
entirely on price changes. Part of the adjustment is borne 
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by permanent changes in interest rates and nominal velocity. 
The model does not display the classical long run trait of 
money neutrality. 
To put it another way consider a no growth economy, i.e. 
one in which exogenous demand is constant through time. A 
10% increase in the money stock does not imply a 10% increase 
in prices. At the new equilibrium prices will have increased 
somewhat less than 10%, interest rates will have declined, 
and real output increased. 
Another principal tenet of monetary theorists is that a 
rate of monetary growth equal to the rate of increase in real 
output will lead to long run price stability. Under certain 
conditions the model displays this characteristic, under 
others it does not. The difference results from choice of 
initial conditions used to start up the model. 
Consider the system summarized by Equations 2.32 through 
2.34. Equation 2.34 may be used to eliminate P* from the 
first expression in 2.33. The second expression in 2.33 may 
then be used to eliminate all Y* terms. This yields 
^t * ^t-2 
P t-1 
't-2 EA 
Equation 2.32 is of the form 
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for any constant growth rate of exogenous demand the K's will 
cancel on substitution. Thus 
^t * ^t-2 
t-1 
M t-2 
M t-1 
EA(l-6) 
1-ÔEA 
For every constant rate of growth of the money stock the RHS 
equals one. Then 
t-1 
-t-1 
^t-2 
a second order difference equation completely determined by 
the two initial conditions and independent of the rate of 
monetary growth so long as it remains constant. Given un­
favorable initial conditions it is not possible to achieve 
both constant prices and a rate of monetary growth equal to 
the long term rate of growth in exogenous demand. For 
example in a no growth system with constant money stock but 
initial prices nonconstant, prices will continue to grow 
forever at the initial rate. 
Utilizing the lagged adjustment price Equation 2.36 in 
place of 2.34 yields similar assymptotic results. 
Solution of 2,33 and 2.36 gives 
fP t ' "t-2 
t-1 
t-1 t-3 
t-2 
ÔEA M. t-1 M. t-3 
M t-2 
C1-S)EA 
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Again for a constant rate of monetary growth, any steady rate 
of price change specified in initial conditions, zero or non­
zero, will be perpetuated forever. Thus if = P^d+k) and 
Pg = P^(l+k), then prices will grow at rate k for all time 
with any steady rate of monetary growth. 
This system is even more complex however; the three 
initial conditions need not lie on a steady rate growth path. 
Let = P^ P^^g/^t-l' then Zg = defined by the 
boundary conditions. The ratio of adjacent period prices 
under constant monetary growth is given by 
t-2 , 
Z (6EA)i 
^ , for t > 2. 
t-1 ^1 
Note that both 6 and EA are positive but less than 1. Thus 
the RHS of this expression is bounded by the function 
p 5EA p 
t— ^  z^'GEA . 2 _ ^ constant, 
^t-1 ^ 
The trajectary of prices is asymptotic to some steady rate 
inflation path dependent on initial conditions. 
The model thus far displays all of the short run 
properties usually associated with Income-Expenditure models. 
In addition it possesses some long run properties associated 
with the monetarist position. One slight modification of the 
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system 2.37 yields a system consistent with all the principal 
properties of both approaches. 
The literature in economics is replete with references 
to the full employment level of output. Reasonably this full 
employment level is defined not as the output obtainable by 
maximum utilization of all resources, but as that level 
obtainable by fully utilizing all resources at normal levels. 
Demand inflation theorists have generally argued that levels 
of aggregate demand in excess of such a full employment level 
tend to generate pressure for price increases. Levels of 
aggregate demand below this level create pressures for price 
declines. These pressures are assumed to vary depending on 
the degree of excess demand exhibited by the economy. 
Accordingly the price equation will be modified to allow for 
thi s tendency. 
Define YF as the level of full employment income at 
nominal prices and RYf as the rate of growth of the level of 
full employment, where the level of real full employment is 
determined exogenously as the result of, say, a Walrasian 
general equilibrium process. In a more complex model the 
level of real full employment output would depend, at a 
minimum, on past levels of investment. Exogeneity is assumed 
here as a simplification. Full employment real output is 
assumed to grow at the same rate as the long term trend in 
exogenous demand, a familiar result in capital theory 
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(Sengupta, 1970; Shell, 1967). Then 
'Yf, 
Yft = t-l 
Pt-1 
•(1 + RYf) • 
Using this full employment level of real output as a 
reference point, a "Keynesian" price adjustment mechanism 
may be introduced into the model (Keynes, 1936, Chapter 21). 
It is assumed that there exists a positive relationship 
between the level of real output and the rate of change of 
prices. Such a macroeconomic relationship has a firm micro-
economic foundation. In the short run as real output is 
increased from low to high levels relative to the normal full 
employment level of real output, a number of factors combine 
to increase unit production costs. As more variable imputs 
are applied to fixed factors of production in many industries, 
declining marginal productivity may tend to drive up unit 
costs. Further increased factor demand tends to increase the 
bargaining power of primary and intermediate production 
factors, leading to higher factor imput costs. Finally as 
production capacity is approached in certain industries 
bottlenecks and shortages may develop,. These and similar 
forces tend to lead producers to attempt to increase output 
prices. At the same time increases in aggregate income 
generated by increased factor employment lead to demand shifts 
for individual commodities. The net result may well be 
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gradual increases in the aggregate price level. 
It is assumed that at a constant price level there exists 
some level of real factor employment which is considered 
normal in some sense, and that this level of employment does 
not generate pressures for changes in the aggregate price 
level on balance. However deivations from this level create 
inflationary pressures, positive or negative, which tend to 
return the system to the normal full employment level. It is 
recognized that this mechanism is but one of many forces 
which act in conjunction to determine the average level of 
prices. 
The importance of this modification for the present model 
lies in the fact that it forces a complete price adjustment 
in the long run to disturbances which result from purely 
monetary forces. It is the linkage between real output and 
the price level which adds to the behavior of the system the 
properties of (1) long run money neutrality in response to a 
one time monetary disturbance, and (2) long run price 
stability properties which are independent of the initial 
rate of change in prices. In all cases a rate of growth of 
the money stock equal to the rate of growth of exogenous 
demand and real full employment output will result in 
assymptotically stable prices. 
Equation 2.34 may be modified by adding the ratio 
(Y^/Yf^) to the RHS, To allow partial price response in any 
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given period this ratio is raised to a positive power EF < 1. 
Thus 2.34 becomes 
= 
EA 
1 t t 
Y* Yf^ t t 
EF 
(2.38) 
Lagging the income dependent effects one period as 
before. Equation 2.36, yields 
p^ = p* fVi' 
EA 
r?t.i ' 
EF 
(2.39) 
Table 4 contains a simulation of the model 2.37 with this 
single modification. Note in the final 10 period segment 
that, even though the system has not completely adjusted, 
within acceptable tolerances velocity and the rate of interest 
are approaching what they were in the first 5 period block. 
Prices apparently are absorbing the entire brunt of adjustment. 
To characterize the behavior of the system still further 
consider the effect of a permanent 20% increase of the money 
stock in a no growth economy. Results of such an exercise are 
shown in Table 5. 
Tables 4 and 5 serve to demonstrate the essential and 
unique properties of the model. First, the basic properties 
of the model do not depend on the long term growth rate of 
the economy; the economy may be growing through time as in 
Table 4 or static as in Table 5. It is possible then to 
Table 2.4. Behavior of the modified model in a growing economy 
Y/P Y %AY p %AP Y* P* M V R 
216.34 216 .34 0 .0000 1. 0000 0.000 216. 34 1. 0000 100. 00 2 .16 6. 24 
222.83 222 .83 2 .9999 1. 0000 0.000 222. 83 1. 0000 103. 00 2 .16 6. 24 
229.51 229 .51 2 .9999 1. 0000 0.000 229. 51 1. 0000 106. 09 2 .16 6. 24 
236.40 236 .40 3 .0000 1. 0000 0.000 236. 40 1. 0000 109. 27 2 .16 6. 24 
243.49 243 .49 3 .0000 1. 0000 0.000 243. 49 1. 0000 112. 55 2 .16 6. 24 
255.64 255 .64 4 .9904 1. 0000 0.000 250, 79 1. 0000 119. 30 2 .14 5. 95 
265.67 269 .77 5 .5277 1. 0154 1.543 263. 81 1. 0000 126. 46 2 .13 5. 82 
274.82 285 .34 5 .7726 1. 0383 2.251 279. 02 1. 0170 134. 05 2 .13 5. 76 
283.48 302 .24 5 .9224 1. 0662 2.686 295. 79 1. 0420 142. 09 2 .13 5. 73 
291.87 320 .44 6 .0204 1. 0979 2.972 313. 98 1. 0725 150. 62 2 .13 5. 74 
290.64 329 .16 2 .7205 1. 1325 3.155 333. 56 1. 1070 152. 12 2 .16 6. 25 
294.22 335 .34 1 .8781 1. 1397 0.638 342. 18 1. 1445 153. 65 2 .18 6. 52 
300.07 340 .37 1 .5004 1. 1343 -0.477 347. 91 1. 1513 155. 18 2 .19 6. 68 
307.45 344 .68 1 .2659 1. 1211 -1.165 352. 35 1. 1441 156. 73 2 .20 6. 77 
316.00 348 .50 1 .1074 1. 1028 -1.628 356. 03 1. 1285 158. 30 2 .20 6. 81 
331.89 358 .92 2 .9908 1. 0814 -1.940 359. 20 1. 1076 164. 63 2 .18 6. 19 
345.45 371 .33 3 .4567 1. 0749 -0.603 369. 92 1. 0835 171. 22 2 .17 6. 32 
358.17 384 .91 3 .6577 lo 0747 -0.022 382. 85 1. 0761 178. 07 2 .16 6. 21 
370.45 399 .47 3 .7833 1. 0783 0.340 397. 07 1. 0757 185. 19 2 .16 . 6. 15 
382.52 414 .93 3 .8709 1. 0847 0.595 412. 34 1. 0796 192. 60 2 .15 6. 11 
391.97 428 .48 3 .2655 1. 0932 0.775 428. 57 1. 0866 198. 38 2 .16 6. 19 
402.70 441 .90 3 .1309 1. 0973 0.381 442. 55 1. 0957 204. 33 2 .16 6. 23 
414.15 455 .50 3 .0793 1. 0999 0.231 456. 34 1. 1000 210. 46 2 .16 6. 25 
426.17 269 .39 3 .0487 1. 1014 0.142 470. 31 1. 1025 216. 77 2 .17 6. 27 
438.72 483 .60 3 .0279 1. 1023 0.081 484. 55 1. 1040 223. 27 2 .17 6. 28 
451.76 498 .18 3 .0133 1. 1027 0.038 499. 12 1. 1047 229. 97 2 .17 6. 28 
465.28 513 .14 3 .0033 1. 1028 0.009 514. 07 1. 1049 236, 87 2 .17 6. 28 
479.27 528 .52 2 .9966 1. 1027 -0.009 529. 41 1. 1048 243. 98 2 .17 6. 28 
493.73 544 .33 2 .9924 1. 1025 -0.022 545. 18 1. 1045 251. 30 2 .17 6. 28 
508.64 560 .61 2 .9900 1. 1022 -0.029 561. 41 1. 1041 258. 84 2 .17 6. 28 
Table 2.5. Behavior of the modified model in a stationary economy 
Y/P Y %AY P %AP Y* P* M V R 
216. 34 216. 34 0 .0000 1. 0000 0 .000 216 .34 1. 0000 100. 00 2 .16 6. 24 
216. 34 216. 34 0 .0000 1. 0000 0 .000 216 .34 1. 0000 100. 00 2 .16 6. 24 
216. 34 216. 34 0 .0000 1. 0000 0 .000 216 .34 1. 0000 100. 00 2 .16 6. 24 
216. 34 216. 34 0 .0000 1. 0000 0 .000 216 .34 1. 0000 100. 00 2 .16 6. 24 
216. 34 216. 34 0 .0000 1. 0000 0 .000 216 .34 1. 0000 100. 00 2 .16 6. 24 
230. 53 230. 53 6 .5602 1. 0000 0 .000 216 .34 1. 0000 110. 00 2 .10 5. 32 
222. 85 234. 47 1 .7088 1. 0521 5 .214 232 .00 1. 0000 110. 00 2 .13 5. 79 
219. 45 236. 28 0 .7725 1. 0767 2 .335 236 .21 1. 0575 110. 00 2 .15 6. 02 
217. 39 237. 39 0 .4711 1. 0920 1 .419 238 .04 1. 0841 110. 00 2 .16 6. 16 
216. 06 238. 12 0 .3076 1. 1021 0 .925 239 .10 1. 1003 110. 00 2 .16 6. 26 
215. 21 238. 59 0 .1968 1. 1086 0 .591 239 .74 1. 1107 110. 00 2 .17 6. 32 
214. 71 238. 87 0 .1179 1. 1126 0 .354 240 .09 1. 1171 110. 00 2 .17 6. 36 
214. 44 239. 02 0 .0620 1. 1146 0 .186 240 .26 1. 1206 110. 00 2 .17 6. 38 
214. 34 239. 08 0 .0232 1. 1154 0 .069 240 .28 1. 1221 110. 00 2 .17 6. 39 
214. 36 239. 07 -0 .0031 1. 1153 -0 .009 240 .22 1. 1222 110. 00 2 .17 6. 39 
214. 44 239. 02 -0 .0202 1. 1146 -0 .060 240 .09 1. 1214 110. 00 2 .17 6. 38 
214. 57 238. 95 -0 .0305 1. 1136 -0 .091 239 .94 1. 1200 110. 00 2 .17 6. 37 
214. 73 238. 86 -0 .0360 1. 1124 — 0 .108 239 .76 1. 1183 110. 00 2 .17 6. 36 
214. 89 238. 77 -0 .0382 1. 1111 -0 .114 239 .59 1. 1165 110. 00 2 .17 6. 35 
215. 06 238. 68 -0 .0382 1. 1099 —0 .114 239 .41 1. 1147 110. 00 2 .17 6. 33 
215. 21 238. 59 -0 .0366 1. 1086 -0 .109 239 .25 1. 1130 110. 00 2 .17 6. 32 
215. 36 238. 51 -0 .0342 1. 1075 -0 .102 239 .10 1. 1113 110. 00 2 .17 6. 31 
215. 49 238. 44 -0 .0312 1. 1065 -0 .093 238 .96 1. 1098 110. 00 2 .17 6. 30 
215. 62 238. 37 -0 .0281 1. 1055 -0 .084 238 .83 1. 1084 110. 00 2 .17 6. 29 
215. 72 238. 31 -0 .0249 1. 1047 -0 .074 238 .72 1. 1072 110. 00 2 .17 6. 28 
215. 82 233. 26 -0 .0219 1. 1040 -0 .065 238 .62 1. 1061 110. 00 2 .17 6. 28 
215. 90 238. 21 -0 .0190 1. 1033 -0 .057 238 .53 1. 1052 110. 00 2 .17 6. 27 
215. 97 238. 17 -0 .0164 1. 1028 -0 .049 238 .45 1. 1044 110. 00 2 .17 6. 27 
216. 03 238. 14 -0 .0141 1. 1023 -0 .042 238 .38 1. 1037 110. 00 2 .16 6. 26 
216. 08 238. 11 -0 .0120 1. 1019 -0 .035 238 .33 1. 1031 110. 00 2 .16 6. 26 
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formulate monetary policy in the no growth version of the 
model and interpret the results as deviations from the steady 
growth rate time path. This is a significant conceptual 
simplification. 
Second, the model provides a bridge between the two 
major disjoint branches of economic theory. 
In long run equilibrium it displays all properties 
generally associated with the Monetarist position: Long run 
money neutrality with prices determined in the monetary sector 
through the quantity equation. Transient monetary disturbances 
or once and for all monetary changes have no effect on long 
run equilibrium in the real sector. Monetary growth at the 
same rate as exogenous demand and full employment real output 
results in an aggregate price level which is asymptotically 
constant through time, regardless of initial conditions. In 
the short run however it behaves as an Income—Expenditure 
model: Changes in the money stock affect the quantity of real 
investment and the rate of interest and through this mechanism 
lead to changes in real output. 
Only within the context of such a model is it possible 
to attack the question of optimal monetary policy formulation 
in a realistic fashion. It is generally accepted that an 
increase in the money stock affects both real output and 
prices even in the short run. Within the context of this 
model one may compare explicitly the full implications of 
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particular policy proposals. Given an objective function 
which places appropriate weights on full employment and 
inflation control, it is possible to compute the best time 
path for the money stock. Without such a model one may only 
say that money should be a bit easier or a little bit tighter 
but one cannot say how much. 
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CHAPTER III 
Section A 
The objectives of monetary stabilization policy are 
generally characterized as (1) full employment and (2) price 
stability. In principal it is possible to specify an objec­
tive function which is capable of measuring the extent to 
which these two objectives are met. Using such a function 
together with a model of the economy which incorporates both 
of the arguments of that function as endogenous variables, it 
is possible to compare the performance of various strategies 
of monetary control. Indeed, given the definition of 
comparability established in the objective function, it is 
possible to determine that particular monetary control 
strategy which is optimal. Such an exercise clearly is only 
possible within the context of a model in which both prices 
and income are endogenous. 
The dynamic model developed in the preceding chapter 
provides the theoretical framework within which questions of 
optimal monetary policy formulation may be investigated. 
Within such a framework economists may be led to ask the 
proper questions. It is hoped that such questions may then 
lead to answers which are economically meaningful. 
Economists of the Monetarist persuasion view control of 
the money stock by the central bank as a powerful and flexible 
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tool for economic stabilization policy. However the published 
literature contains relatively few discussions of what would 
indeed constitute an optimal policy. What little debate there 
has been has focused on the "rules versus discretion" contro­
versy. The precise nature of the problem at issue has been 
unclear, however, in part because neither side has defined its 
case in terms of some specified, intertemporal optimality 
criterion and also because explicit models of the economy have 
not generally been employed as a theoretical basis for discus­
sion. The present approach is a first step toward resolving 
this issue. 
Proponents of discretionary action on the part of 
monetary authorities have argued, plausibly enough, that the 
central bank can substantially influence movements in the 
stock of money held by the private sector and hence, through 
the Quantity Theory mechanism, should be able to influence 
movements in nominal income. This position has been subjected 
to a three pringed attack. The most serious objection stems 
from the fact that central bank actions seem incapable of 
dominating movements in the money stock in the extreme short 
run, particularly monthly movements. Even in the case of 
quarterly averages, proximate determinants of the money stock 
not under central control, the currency to deposit ratio for 
example, play important and very independent roles (c.f., 
Cagan, 1965). Under this line of reasoning aggregates directly 
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controllable by the central bank—the monetary base, free 
reserves, interest rates, etc.—become the appropriate control 
variables (c.f., Pindyck and Roberts, 1974). The second line 
of attack stems from the inability of policy makers to esti­
mate accurately future and even current values of important 
economic aggregates, especially private investment, fiscal 
receipts and expenditures, and national income. Finally, 
discretionary monetary policy is severely complicated by the 
lag in effect of monetary action. Since a change in monetary 
policy makes itself felt not only in the current time period 
but also for several future periods, appropriate policy 
determination at any time cannot be divorced from previous 
policy directions. This third difficulty further compounds 
the first two problems. It is interesting to note that in no 
case is the attack based on criteria of dynamic optimality of 
some alternate policy model. 
Such issues are clearly of fundamental importance. 
However they are not the points at issue in the present 
discussion. It is assumed here that the money stock is in 
fact an exogenous policy instrument. It is further assumed 
that reliable estimates of exogenous components of aggregate 
demand are available to policy makers. 
These are restrictive assumptions. However they allow 
this discussion to center on even more basic issues : the 
determination of an optimal monetary policy and the gains 
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which result from the pursuit of such a policy. If such gains 
can be clearly demonstrated, it then becomes fruitful to 
devise methods to control money more closely and to obtain 
improved economic forecasts. 
We have reached the stage in the development of macro-
economic theory where it is generally recognized that the 
relationships being dealt with are essentially dynamic in 
nature. Furthermore the focus of the attention of the 
economic analyst has shifted. Not too many years ago 
economists concerned themselves with the "long run", with 
"normal" prices, with the "steady state equilibrium". More 
recently, however, macroeconomists have taken Keynes' maxim 
to heart; "In the long run we all are dead," Concern has 
shifted to "short run" analysis with emphasis on adjustment 
mechanisms and policy formulation. 
Beginning at least with John Maynard Keynes, the 
principal expository tool of macro analysis has been that of 
comparative statics. Comparative static analysis is most 
properly suitable to the comparison of alternate steady state 
solutions each of which might be expected to prevail for such 
a long time duration that any intermediate adjustment periods 
may be safely ignored. The thrust of analysis is aimed at 
the properties of the steady state rather than at the 
properties of the system during the adjustment period. This 
comparative static mentality leads to a decision making 
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process characterized by the comparison of various policy 
proposals and their associated long run results. Some con­
sideration may be given of course to the expected behavior 
of the economic system during the adjustment period. Such 
discussions however are not generally of central importance, 
and the models employed often are poorly adapted to such 
analysis. 
This difficulty becomes further compounded when the 
properties of the dynamic adjustment path are considered 
equally as important as the steady state properties of the 
system. Dynamic systems, particularly nonlinear systems are 
extremely complex. Well intentioned policies formulated with 
an incomplete appreciation of the dynamic relationships being 
dealt with may well lead to unexpected and even perverse 
results. Additionally, even in the simplest of dynamic 
systems the number of possible policy proposals multiplies 
very quickly. As a practical matter it is generally impossible 
to consider all possible proposals; often debate centers solely 
on a comparison of a very few extreme positions. 
Policy formulation by such a primitive technique may be 
characterized as "best" or "optimal" only in a very restricted 
sense. One may reasonably suspect that the policy which is 
indeed optimal has gone unnoticed due to the complexities 
inherent in any dynamic system. This seems to have been the 
case in the debate on the wisdom and proper form of an optimal 
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monetary stabilization policy. Techniques are needed which 
are capable of isolating that time path of the policy variables 
which is truly optimal in a dynamic setting. 
Dynamic problems of this sort fall within the mathematical 
realm loosely referred to as control theory. While control 
theory traces its roots to the classical variational calculus, 
the modern approach to such problems derives more directly 
from the work of Pontryagin, Bellman, and many others. 
Analytic solutions are obtainable for only the simplest 
classes of control problems. However these modern approaches 
suggest numerical techniques which are capable of generating 
solutions for a much broader spectrum of problems. 
The control problem with which we are dealing here 
consists of three basic elements. First a mathematical 
description of the system to be controlled has been developed 
in Chapter II. Second a performance index must be constructed 
by which the behavior of the system may be evaluated. Finally 
one must specify the set of admissible control imputs, the 
money stock in the present case, and the set of uncontrollable 
imputs, in this case the initial conditions of the state 
variables, exogenous demand, and the level of full employment 
GNP. 
There are innumerable indices which could be created to 
measure the efficacy of stabilization policy for any 
particular point in time. Plausibly the performance index 
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chosen should impose a penalty for excessive rates of unemploy­
ment, i.e. levels of real output below the full employment 
level. In addition a penalty will be levied for any price 
changes. The goal of price stability is more closely related 
to the minimization of period to period price changes than to 
maintenance of a constant level of prices through time. One 
such index is defined below as the function COST(t), a 
weighted sum of these two factors, with Z the relative weight 
to be placed on the inflation component. 
COST(t) = \ - ^ ^t 
Yf, + Z 
^t - Pt-1 
t-1 
(3.1) 
Thus COST(t) is a function only of Y 
desired, a new variable could be introduced into the 
system making COST(t) a function only of the state of the 
system at t. Note further that new variables XI and X2 could 
be defined such that 
X1 
^"t ~ Yf_ 
COST(t) = (Xl^ - 1)^ + Z (X2^ - 1) (3.2) 
Cost(t) is then a quadratic form in the new state variables. 
If the purpose of the present discussion were a proof of the 
existence of an optimal monetary path or with the computation 
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of the analytical solution for such a path, such a transforma­
tion would be desirable. There is a well developed body of 
literature dealing with optimal control of systems with 
quadratic cost functionals. The principal purpose here is 
expository however. It is desirable to remain as close as 
possible to the original model. The existence of an optimal 
solution will be assumed here. This assumption will later be 
buttressed by the computation of a solution which is, by all 
appearances, optimal. 
The function COST assigns a scalar index number by which 
the performance of the economy may be evaluated at any point 
in time. In a consideration of the efficacy of monetary 
stabilization policy we wish to somehow capture the net 
performance of that policy over a horizon at least as long as 
a complete business cycle. Monetary action taken today 
affects the economy today, tomorrow, and on into the future. 
It is not immediately clear what criteria should be used 
to judge whether policy A is superior to policy B. We might 
require, for example, that the following relationship hold 
between the cost functions COST^(t) and COSTg(t) generated by 
A and B respectively. 
COST^(t) < COSTg(t), t = 1, 2,...,N 
COST^(t) < COSTg(t) for at least one t (3.3) 
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An alternate, and somewhat weaker criterion, is that of 
requiring 
N N 
Z COST.(i) < Z COST„(i) (3.4) 
i=t ^ i=t * 
This second alternative is the one employed in control theory. 
It allows the formulation of policies which permit the 
intertemporal trade off of current costs for future benefits. 
For example it may be desirable to temporarily create rather 
large levels of unemployment through a tight monetary policy 
in order to achieve the goal of price stability in the future. 
Thus the objective of control in this model is that of 
minimizing 
N 
J(t) = E COST(i) (3.5) 
i=t 
subject to the equations governing the dynamics of the system. 
Equations Al to A4 of Appendix A, and the given initial condi­
tions of the system. 
There are various analytical methods designed to deal 
with the general control problems of the form 
N 
Min J(t)= Min Z COST (i) 
u u i=t 
subject to the dynamic system 
*t+l = f(Xt' "t' 
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with 
a k X 1 vector; 
X^; given initial conditions (3.6) 
The approach pioneered in the work of Pontryagin and others 
(1962) involves the conversion of this constrained minimiza­
tion problem into an unconstrained problem by the introduction 
of a vector of co-state variables serving a function analogous 
to that performed by the Lagrangean multipliers in a static 
minimization problem. The auxiliary problem then takes the 
form 
Min[H(x^, u^, t) - ^ t^t+l^ (3.7) 
where H = J + X^f. 
For an optimal interior solution to this new problem it is 
necessary that this new function represent a stationary solu­
tion with respect to all the variables of the system (Athans 
and Falb, 1966). This requirement leads to the set of 
necessary first order conditions often called the canonical 
equations of the system. These equations correspond to the 
Euler Equations of the Calculus of Variations. 
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\+l - for t - 1, 2 N 
X t t+l 
(3.8) 
For some special cases these equations may be solved 
analytically for the optimal control path U*, X*. Typically 
the first condition is used to eliminate U from the remaining 
equations. One is left then with the problem of solving a 
two point value problem for a system of 2k first order dif­
ference equations. If the number of state variables is very 
large or if the difference equations are nonlinear, this is 
not a trivial problem. The first order conditions 3.8 
provide necessary conditions for an interior extremal solution. 
Second order properties of the system may be investigated to 
insure the extremal is indeed a minimum. The first expression 
in 3.8 requires the auxilary function to be an extremal with 
respect to the control vector. To guarantee that this occurs 
at a relative minimum the second partial derivative, the 
Hessian determinant in vector space, must be nonnegative, the 
classical Legendre condition. 
(3.9) 
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Further to guarantee global minimization the auxiliary func­
tion must be weakly concave in U, the Wierstrass condition 
H(X*, X*, U*, t) < H(X^, U^, t) 
h ati 
+ (U^ - u^) (X^, x^, U^, t) (3.10) 
Here U*, X*/ X* represent optimal control paths, and U, X, X 
represent any other admissible trajectory. 
There are two basic classes of numerical solution 
techniques for the general control problem. Indirect methods 
are those which employ iterative techniques to approximate 
the solution of the 2k difference equations described in the 
preceding paragraph. There are standard iterative computa­
tional programs for solving certain types of systems of 
difference or differential equations. Additionally, the 
functional form of the solution is known for several standard 
types of control problems. For problems yielding canonical 
equations which conform to one of these standard types an 
indirect solution method may be employed. The most common 
example is the case in which the objective function in a 
quadratic form in both the state and control vectors and the 
dynamic equations are linear in the difference operator. 
Solutions may be obtained for systems containing a rather 
large number of state variables. 
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Direct solution methods are those in which the optimal 
control is determined by operating directly on the performance 
index J. An initial trial control sequence ul is selected and 
the system is simulated. Using information based on J, the 
gradient of J, and in some methods the second derivative, the 
initial control sequence is modified to produce a new trial 
sequence u2. Hopefully upon iteration the control sequence 
converges to the optimal sequence u* which minimizes J. 
Methods which employ only first order information fall into 
the generic class of steepest descent techniques (Curry, 1944). 
They generally display the property of fast convergence to a 
neighborhood about u*, slow convergence thereafter. Second 
order techniques converge more slowly initially, but more q 
quickly later on, and thus are sensitive to the initial trial 
solution choice, ul. Currently the most popular algorithms 
are the Conjugate-Gradient and Davidon methods; they employ 
both first and second order information combining the advantage 
of each. 
An extensive discussion of solution algorithms may be 
found in Bellman and Dreyfus (1962) along with an annotated 
bibliography. An application of Conjugate-Gradient and Davidon 
methods to two sector economic growth models may be found in 
Keller (1972). This contains a Fortran code used in the solu­
tion of this type of problem as well as a theoretical discus­
sion. An interesting discussion of the solution of discrete 
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time control problems by nonlinear maximization techniques may 
be found in Fair (1974). 
Computational solution algorithms for control problems 
are extremely problem particular. The particular solution 
technique appropriate to a given problem is dependent on the 
complexity of the relationships involved, the amount of a 
priori information available, the degree of accuracy desired 
in the result, and the amount of money available to buy 
computer time. General programs designed to handle a wide 
range of nonlinear problems are computationally expensive; 
often however significant short cuts may be suggested by the 
nature of the problem under consideration. Thus the potential 
user is advised that he will probably end up writing his own 
program unless his problem is of the linear-quadratic type 
mentioned in the discussion of indirect solution techniques. 
Section B 
Direct solution techniques often rely heavily on the 
principle of the dynamic programming approach to the solution 
of sequential optimization problems developed and popularized 
by Bellman and Dreyfus (1957, 1962). The sequential solution 
algorithms employed have their basis in Bellman's Principle 
of Optimality (1957, p. 83). 
An optimal policy has the property that, whatever the 
initial state and decision are, the remaining decision 
must constitute an optimal policy with regard to the 
state resulting from the first decision. 
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Aris (1964, p. 27) expressed the proposition somewhat 
I 
more succinctly. "If you don't do the best with what you 
happen to have got, you'll never do the best you might have 
done with what you should have had." 
Properly speaking, dynamic programming is not in itself 
either a direct or indirect solution method, but rather a 
fruitful approach to the solution of a wide variety of 
sequential problems. Consider the problem 
N 
Min J(t) = S COST(x., u. , i) (3.11) 
u i=t ^ ^ 
The principle of optimality allows the problem to be broken 
into two parts. Thus the general control problem may also be 
formulated as a problem of sequential decision making. 
J* . = Min COST(x , u. , t) + Min J(t+1) (3.12) 
u ^ ^ u 
This fundamental recurrence relationship permits the iterative 
solution of the system by proceeding in reverse order from 
t = N to t = 1. Thus at each stage the second term on the RHS 
has already been minimized; one is left with the problem of the 
minimization of current costs given the state at t. 
This approach may be combined with a direct method 
optimization search technique to arrive at an optimal solution 
to the problem. An initial trial control trajectory is 
selected arbitrarily and used to generate the time path for 
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the state variables x through time. Then, working back from 
the terminal period to the initial period, the initial control 
sequence is modified at each stage to move the cost function 
in the negative gradient direction. After a number of itera­
tions the trial control path converges, hopefully, to the 
optimal path. 
One method for computing the gradient direction for a 
function with only one control variable is to compare the 
value of the function at u^ with its values at u^ + e and 
u^ - e for some small, positive e. If f(u^ + e) is less than 
f(u^) an increase in the trial control u^ is appropriate. If 
f(u^ - e) is less than f(u^) a decrease in u^ is called for. 
Due to the lag structure embodied in the present model 
one slight modification of this basic algorithm is called for. 
The state of a system is the vector of variables containing 
that minimum body of information available at t which 
summarizes a sufficient quantity of information about the 
past history of the system such that, together with informa­
tion about the future path of the control variables and other 
exogenous system inputs, the future trajectory of the system 
may be computed. Thus for the present model a complete state 
description at time t is given by all endogenous variables 
indexed at t plus the price index and nominal income lagged 
one period. For example the boundary conditions of Appendix A 
provide a sufficient description of the state at t = 0. 
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Thus a marginal change in M, the control variable in 
the model, affects directly not only the state at t but also 
the state of the system in the next period. Since the 
dynamic iteration algorithm works in reverse order, an 
extension of the method is necessary to compensate for such 
lag effects. Further there are significant indirect effects 
on the state at t + 2 which result from a change in M. 
Consideration of these indirect effects, while not necessary, 
improve initial convergence properties without greatly 
increasing computation costs. It does so however at some 
sacrifice of convergence speed and sensitivity in the neighbor­
hood of the optimal path. 
The fundamental recursive relationship used here is a 
slight modification of that described earlier. At each stage 
only M is modified. However the criteria upon which this 
modification is based include consideration of direct and 
indirect lagged effects. The new term is assigned the code 
name TCOST. 
t+2 
TCOST(t) = Z COST(i) (3.13) 
i=t 
The precise nature of the computational procedure is 
most easily summarized in a basic process flow diagram. Such 
a diagram follows as Figure 3.1. The computer code used to 
execute this algorithm may be found in Appendix D. 
The algorithm displays good convergence properties. It 
is not particularly sensitive to the initial trial control 
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path, although the better the initial guess the faster is the 
convergence. Typically the algorithm converges after thirteen 
or fourteen iterations using about 15 seconds CPU time for the 
twenty period cases considered in the next chapter. 
Conceptually the problem may be viewed as that of 
choosing N variables, M, through M^, to minimize a nonlinear 
function of 2N variables, Y, through Y^, and P, through P^j, 
subject to the constraints of N nonlinear relationships imposed 
by the dynamic structure in each period. Considering the 
complexity of the problem, the algorithm generates solutions 
with surprising speed. The method is a graphic illustration 
of the power of the dynamic programming approach to sequential 
problem solving. 
Figure 3.1. Flow chart 
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CHAPTER IV 
Section A 
The necessary tools have now been developed to compute an 
optimal monetary stabilization policy. Clearly the monetary 
policies arrived at are particular to the form of the objective 
function used to measure policy performance and to the nature 
of the dynamic system used to describe the economy. Computa­
tions were carried out using cost functions representative of 
a variety of policy goal orientations. Results of these 
exercises are the subject of this chapter. 
This paper is primarily concerned with the issues raised 
by optimality analysis. The problem of the specification of 
the proper form for the objective function or the intricacies 
of the dynamic structure of the model are of only secondary 
interest here. The forms of the objective functions and the 
dynamic structure employed have been chosen as a necessary 
compromise between realism and solvability. 
Problem A; A business cycle problem 
In this and subsequent sections we wish to examine the 
economic stabilization question. A fluctuation in exogenous 
demand will be used to generate a "business cycle" of twenty 
periods duration. Recall the investment equation of the model. 
Equation A7 of Appendix A. 
76 
(4.1) 
where 
t 
B. = b? ' n {(1 + RBI. )(1 + RYf)} 
t J. i^ l 1 
The function 
RBI. = 0.06 sin 1 N (4.2) 
is used to generate a sine wave business cycle. If interest 
rates were to remain constant.- this would generate a cyclic 
variation in real output and investment. Simulations were 
undertaken in a stationary economy with RYf set equal to zero. 
To provide a benchmark for use in comparing alternate 
policies, the model was simulated with a procyclic monetary 
policy. Next a Friedman Rule policy was generated. Finally, 
using this path as an initial trial estimate, the dynamic 
programming algorithm was employed to yield an optimal time 
path. 
Optimal controls were first generated for objective 
functions of the form 
where the parameter Z reflects the relative policy importance 
of the price stability objective versus the full employment 
objective. Z weights of 0.1, 1.0, and 10.0 were used to allow 
N 'Y. - Yf^2 
J(t) = Z ^ ya + Z 
i=t 
(4.3) 
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comparison of policies employing normal full employment, 
balanced full employment and price stability, and price 
stability policy orientations. 
The first case considered was that in which Z = 1. The 
procyclic policy yielded a total cost J = 240.30 points. As 
would be expected, the Friedman Rule policy performed 
considerably better with a total cost of J = 26.97 points. 
After five iterations by the dynamic program this was reduced 
to J = 6.33. By the end of nine more iterations J was reduced 
to J = 0.64. At this point convergence within the tolerances 
of the program had been reached; further iterations produced 
no further modification of the control variable. The program 
could be modified to achieve closer convergence by reducing 
the stepsize variable and increasing the sensitivity of the 
numerical gradient approximation technique. 
The fact that the cost functional converges essentially 
to zero is extremely interesting. It suggests that monetary 
policy goals of maintaining both normal full employment and 
price stability are fully achievable over the course of a 
business cycle. Thus any policy which maintains real output 
at the full employment level will not lead to inflation. 
Conversely a zero price change policy can only be effected by 
maintaining full employment. This proposition is a logical 
result of the structure of the model. Such a zero cost 
control path will be referred to as the Golden Rule path. 
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Since the Golden Rule trajectory is fully obtainable in this 
case, it follows that this path is independent of the relative 
weights placed on the full employment and price stability 
components of the objective function. Given a set of initial 
conditions which lie on the path, the price stability and full 
employment goals are equivalent. 
Moreover confirmation of this proposition under various 
policy weight ratios was used as a test of the accuracy of 
the dynamic programming algorithm. Calculations for Z = 0.1, 
Z = 1, and Z = 10, where Z is the relative weight placed on 
the price stability term of the objective function, yielded 
monetary trajectories which differed at most by one percent 
from the average at any point in time. 
The results of this exercise are most easily presented 
in graphical form since qualitative comparisons rather than 
the actual data points are of primary interest» While the 
graphs are largely self-explanatory, several points are of 
particular interest. 
In Figure 4.1 the optimal monetary policy is, as one 
would expect, counter cyclical. It is interesting to note 
however that monetary movements are apparently in phase with 
the exogenous demand cycle—even though monetary changes 
affect the state variables directly for two periods with 
strong indirect effects for one more period. Finally the 
horizon effect usually associated with finite time free 
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endpoint problems does not appear since the value of the cost 
function can be driven to zero in every period. No trade-off 
occurs between the full employment output and price stability 
objective. 
Normal income and prices, and hence real income, are 
completely stabilized under this policy objective. The 
compatability of the two policy goals is not surprising given 
the nature of the dynamic structure of the model. Nonetheless 
discovery of the precise monetary policy which meets both 
goals at once is of some considerable interest. 
Finally in Figure 4.7 and 4.8 it is interesting to 
observe that velocity and interest rates behave in a pro-
cyclic fashion. This is consistent with empirical observations 
about the behavior of these variables. More surprising however 
is close agreement of the magnitude of these two variables 
among the various policies. There is little difference in the 
maximum rate of interest produced by the procyclic and optimal 
counter cyclic policies. In Section C of this chapter it is 
shown that interest rates can be stablized. This is not 
accomplished however by conducting a counter cyclic monetary 
policy. 
It is tempting to offer a few separate comments on the 
behavior of the system under the procyclic policy. The 
behavior over the first ten periods is of particular interest 
in light of the current U.S. economic situation. A case could 
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be made that the Federal Reserve has pursued a procyclic policy 
from 1968 through 1973 during a period when exogenous demand 
rose and then fell relative to trend. In the present model 
such a procyclic policy produced an in-phase movement in 
nominal income (Figure 4.2). However, due to high levels of 
inflation generated in the process real income began to 
decline after the third period and falls below the full employ­
ment level after the fifth period (Figures 4.3 and 4.4). 
However the inflation rate does not fall to zero until the 
eighth period, and interest rates remain above normal until 
the twelfth period (Figure 4.8). 
Easy money, which in a static IS-LM model generates low 
interest rates has precisely the opposite effect in a dynamic 
setting. During a business cycle boom the interest rate rises 
under all three monetary policies to roughly the same level. 
It would be tempting for the central bank to attempt to ease 
the credit crunch at the peak of the boom by an easy money 
policy. This policy will not necessarily achieve the desired 
result. Such a policy merely generates higher aggregate 
demand, a high rate of inflation which soon dominates income 
changes and crowds out real output and employment, and finally 
higher rates of interest for an extended period. 
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Section B 
In the problem of Section A if an optimal monetary policy 
is pursued throughout the business cycle, the cost function J 
is minimized at J = 0. There exists a monetary policy which 
maintains real output at the normal full employment level and, 
equivalently for this model, leads to a stable level of prices. 
For want of a better name we will refer to this full employ­
ment, zero inflation path as the Golden Rule stabilization 
path. In Section A initial conditions were chosen which 
placed the economy on the Golden Rule path. It is logical to 
consider next the optimal monetary policy when the initial 
conditions do not place the economy on this Golden Rule path. 
Two distinct but related issues are of interest here. 
First is the optimization issue itself: which control 
trajectory is indeed optimal given the initial conditions 
policy makers have to work with? The second is the question 
of the stability of the Golden Rule path; is the Golden Rule 
path a knife edged equilibrium which can only be maintained 
from a particular starting point, or does it represent a 
turnpike toward which all optimal trajectories converge given 
a long enough horizon? 
Problem B; A policy shift problem 
Policy makers, being human, make mistakes. Policy 
objectives change from time to time; certainly not all 
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objectives, if pursued optimally, are consistent with the 
Golden Rule path described above. Assume that, for whatever 
reason, a procyclic monetary policy is pursued for five time 
periods. At that point policy emphasis changes; it is desired 
from then on to minimize the cost function of Section A. Thus 
the optimization problem begins at period t + 6 with initial 
conditions such that real output lies below the full employ­
ment level with prices above the equilibrium level and rising. 
Furthermore the economy is headed into the downturn of the 
business cycle. 
For reference, if a procyclic policy were pursued from 
this point on, the total value of the objective function over 
the remaining 15 periods would be J = 159.44. A procyclic 
policy should be easy to improve on. Recall that in the 
present model long term trend factors have been divided out 
to allow easier consideration of the cyclic stabilization 
problem. The steady rate of monetary growth Friedman Rule 
thus translates into a constant money stock rule. This rule 
yields a total cost of J = 50.80, a considerable improvement 
over the procyclic policy. Next the optimal trajectory was 
computed. The program converged after 13 iterations with a 
computed cost over the 15 period horizon of J = 12.71. 
Results of this exercise are summarized in Figures 4.9 
through 4.13. Note the substantial difference between the 
Friedman Rule trajectory and the optimal money stock 
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trajectory in Figure 4.9. Maximxjiti deviation is on the order 
of 10%; in the Golden Rule initial conditions example of 
Section A the maximum deviation was 2%. Optimal policy is 
clearly extremely sensitive to the state of the economy which 
obtains at the time such policy is determined. 
Throughout the planning horizon prices are increasing 
(see Figure 4.11). Yet optimal policy results in extremely 
rapid monetary expansion over much of the horizon. At first 
glance this is paradoxical. One may gain some intuitive feel 
for why the optimal monetary time path behaves the way it 
does by reference to Figures 4.12 and 4.13. Real income at 
the start of the planning horizon t = 6 is substantially 
below the normal full employment level. Y/P is 2 3.97 as 
opposed to Yf/P of 216.34. In addition exogenous demand 
declines from t = 6 to t = 15. The inflation control objec­
tive is being sacrificed to avoid excessive unemployment. 
The objective function used in the present example 
placed equal weight on the full employment and price stability 
objectives: Z = 1.0. Note in Figure 4.12 that real income 
is gradually increasing in the direction of the full employ­
ment level 216.34. Throughout the same period the rate of 
inflation gradually falls toward zero. Figure 4.13. A more 
restrictive monetary policy in the initial periods would 
decrease the rate of inflation more quickly at a cost of 
lower levels of real output. 
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In Section A with initial conditions which lay on the 
Golden Rule path optimal control resulted in a zero cost 
trajectory. Furthermore that trajectory is independent of 
the relative weights placed on the full employment and price 
stability components of the objective function. 
For initial conditions which do not lie on the Golden 
Rule path, however, the optimal trajectory is not policy 
weight independent. Thus an objective function which places 
greater relative weight on the full employment objective will 
cause this objective to dominate in cases where the 
components of the objective function conflict. Such con­
flicts arise only when the system has been allowed to drift 
away from the Golden Rule path. 
This example provides a graphic illustration of the 
turnpike properties of the system. At time t = 6 when the 
optimization procedure is begun the system is well away from 
the Golden Rule path. By the end of the planning horizon 
however the system is very close to the Golden Rule path. 
Single period objective function costs have declined from 
2.54 in period 6 to 0.38 in the final period. Since in each 
period any deviation from the Golden Rule path generates 
positive costs, this is an indication that the trajectory is 
approaching the zero cost path. 
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An optimal policy has been computed over the planning 
horizon. This is not, however, a zero cost policy. It is a 
cost minimization policy. There is, in short, a cost 
associated with any set of initial conditions not on the 
Golden Rule path. This cost cannot be avoided. In a sense 
policy makers must pay for past mistakes. Furthermore, use 
of fiscal policy instruments in addition to monetary control 
instruments would in no way affect the costs of returning the 
system to a stable price, full employment trajectory. The 
optimal level of real output used to influence the price 
determination mechanism can be completely achieved by monetary 
policy alone. With this objective function fiscal tools are 
redundant. 
An optimal trajectory may be computed for any set of 
initial conditions. Moreover, this trajectory will approach 
the Golden Rule path given enough time. 
Section C 
Full employment and price stability clearly are not the 
only possible stabilization policy goals. Among the many 
conceivable alternatives, the one mentioned most frequently 
is that of interest rate stabilization. In the U.S. the 
precise nature of interest rate stabilization objectives has 
varied from time to time. Immediately following World War II 
it took the form of maintenance of a target rate of interest. 
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The interest rate goal currently pursued by the Fed is aimed 
more at minimizing period to period fluctuations — or at 
least placing boundaries on the acceptable magnitudes of such 
fluctuations. 
This section contains the results of simulations based 
on interest rate stabilization objectives. The results are 
not surprising. They do however point out the power and 
flexibility of the dynamic programming approach to policy 
formulation. 
Problem CI; An interest rate peg problem 
The first policy objective considered was the policy of 
attempting to maintain some target rate of interest, R*. The 
objective function used was 
N 2 
J ( t )  = 2  (R .  -  R * ) ^  ( 4 . 4 )  
i=t ^ 
It is clear in the standard IS-LM model with an exogenous 
price level that this objective can be met by the generation 
of an appropriate procyclic monetary time path. The trajec­
tory of course would not be a full employment trajectory. 
In the present model it is not intuitively obvious that 
this objective can even be met. Levels of real output which 
differ from the full employment level generate price changes. 
The feedback relationships are relatively complex. Other 
things equal an increase in money drives down interest rates. 
It also drives up prices. But inflation under certain 
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conditions implies an increase in nominal income relative to 
money with a resulting increase in interest rates. It is 
possible, a priori, that this will result in a catch up policy 
with money chasing interest rates during upswings and down­
turns in business activity and catching up only at turning 
points. It may not be possible to develop a zero cost 
monetary policy for this objective function. 
For the parameter values used in this simulation, however, 
the system is apparently controllable for this objective func­
tion (see Figure 4.14). The initial trial trajectory used was 
the Friedman Rule trajectory. This time path is plotted along 
with the optimal solution as a benchmark. The complexity of 
the control relationships is reflected in the large number of 
iterations required to produce a solution. The value of the 
objective function for the initial trial was J = 8.64. After 
fifteen iterations this was reduced to J = 1.57, fifteen more 
iterations gave J = 0.86. The algorithm had not converged at 
this point. Changes were still being made in the values of M 
for the final few horizon periods. However the objective 
function was decreased regularly with each pass and appeared 
to be converging to some value in the neighborhood of zero. 
Further expenditures were judged to be unwarranted. 
Attempts to hold down interest rates permit rapid 
increases in real output in initial periods. This in turn 
leads to a high rate of inflation. Ultimately it is inflation 
Figure 4.14. Problem Cl: An interest rate peg problem 
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rather than a decrease in the money stock which acts to lower 
real income (see Figures 4.15 and 4.16), The optimal monetary 
trajectory is found in Figure 4.17. 
Such an interest rate objective clearly leads in this 
model to economic implications which are less than desirable. 
Such results are similar however to those observed by those 
central banks which have sought in the past to peg the rate of 
interest. Interest rate pegging is no longer viewed as a 
viable policy goal since it results in a loss of control over 
the principal objectives of monetary stabilization policy. 
Problem C2; A mixed interest stabilization policy 
An interest rate rule more in line with current practice 
is that of minimizing period to period fluctuations while at 
the same time pursuing the other goals of policy. This 
policy is aimed at promoting stability and regularity in 
financial markets. It has the further advantage of cushioning 
the impact of monetary policy on those sectors of the economy 
which are affected most rapidly by monetary actions, for 
example, housing construction. 
A "pure" stabilization objective was tried initially. 
N 2 
J(t) = E (R. - R. ,) ^ (4.5) 
i=t 1 ^ ^ 
The solution to this problem is considerably more complex than 
that of the previous problem, a simple tracking problem. If a 
zero cost optimal control is obtainable for problem CI, it is 
Figure 4,15, Problem Cl; An interest rate peg problem 
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Figure 4.16. Problem Cl; An interest rate peg problem 
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alao optimal for this objective under the proper initial condi­
tions. However for problem CI the value of the target interest 
rate for each period is known from the start. Here the value 
of the target at each time t, varies with each successive 
iteration. 
As might be expected, the solution algorithm did not 
display entirely satisfactory convergence properties under 
this objective function. Initial iterations quickly 
established a monetary control path qualitatively equivalent 
to the optimal path from problem CI, reducing the value of the 
objective function to about 10% of the Friedman Rule cost. 
With successive iterations however the algorithm refused to 
converge beyond this level. Rather the monetary trajectory 
continued to wander about in the same general neighborhood for 
the next 80 iterations with no appreciable decrease in total 
cost» There are,- apparently, a large number of monetary 
trajectories consistent with a "low" value for this objective 
function. The algorithm seems incapable of distinguishing 
among them. With minor adjustments the algorithm could no 
doubt be improved upon. Present interest however is centered 
on qualitative behavior. 
Interest rate stability, if it is the sole objective of 
monetary policy, is thus qualitatively similar to an interest 
rate peg objective within the context of this model. Typically 
however interest stability is viewed as but one of several 
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policy objectives. 
One possible objective function of this form is 
N fY. - Yf]^ 
J(t) = E ^ yf 
i=t 
2 (4.5) 
Figures 4.18 through 4.21 contain various plots of the control 
results under this objective function for interest stability 
weights, w, of 1.0, 10.0, and 100.0. The interest stability 
objective is incompatible with the goals of full employment 
and price stability. Further for trajectories away from the 
full employment path the full employment and price stability 
objectives are also incompatible. For w = 1.0 the solution 
trajectory is virtually identical to the Golden Rule path of 
Section A. However for higher weights the solution begins to 
take on qualitative characteristics similar to the pure 
stabilization and interest peg objectives discussed earlier. 
If the primary objectives of monetary policy are full 
employment and price stability, great care must then be taken 
when formulating interest stability policy. It is fairly 
clear that persuit of an interest stability objective from 
period to period implies a loss of control over prices and 
employment equivalent to that experienced under an interest 
rate peg. Such considerations apply with particular force to 
Figure 4.18. Problem C2: A mixed interest stability objective 
Ordinate: Interest rate 
Abscissa: Time index 
Key: O : w = 1 
A : w = 10 
+ ; w = 100 
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Figure 4.19. Problem C2: A mixed interest stability objective 
Ordinate : Money stock 
Abscissa; Time index 
Key; 0 ; w = 1 
A ; w = 10 
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Figure 4.20, Problem C2: A mixed interest stability objective 
Ordinate : Price index 
Abscissa: Time index 
Key :i O : w = 1 
A : w = 10 
+ : w - 100 
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Figure 4.21. Problem C2; A mixed interest stability objective 
Ordinate: Real income 
Abscissa: Time index 
Key: 0 : w = 1 
A : w = 10 
+ : w = 100 
2£T 
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the so-called "defensive" operations of the Federal Reserve. 
The line between interest stabilization as discussed above and 
short term, "defensive" stabilization of financial markets may 
be extremely fine and indistinct. 
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CHAPTER V 
The macro economic model developed in Chapter II and 
employed throughout the remainder of the paper is interesting 
in and of itself as a purely theoretical proposition. It 
provides a linkage between the two apparently disjoint branches 
of macro economics; short run Keynesian Income-Expenditure 
analysis, on the one hand, and long run Monetary Theory, on the 
other. It possesses a number of properties, both long run and 
short run, which make it a useful vehicle for demonstrating the 
basic outlines of macro economic relationships. 
Nonetheless, ho model, no matter how useful for exegetical 
purposes, can be convincing unless its basic relationships can 
be made plausible by empirical investigation. For the model 
in question most of the important relationships have been well 
documented. Short run properties of Keynesian models and long 
run properties of Quantity Theory models need no further 
verification for present purposes. The unique feature of this 
model is the inclusion of a price adjustment sector. This is 
the sector which drives the model. This is the equation which 
needs some empirical roots. 
It has been postulated that there are three factors which 
combine to determine the price level at any point in time: 
(1) expectations, or more generally the immediate history of 
prices, (2) the relationship between actual and expected 
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levels of nominal income; and (3) the relationship between the 
actual level of income and what may be called the normal full 
employment level. It is this third relationship which is 
critical. 
Much of the extant econometric work on the determinants 
of price changes may be interpreted in a manner generally 
consistent with the price determination thesis used here. The 
Phillips type studies emphasize the role of the unemployment 
rate, the extent to which the economy is operating at full 
capacity. Cost push studies generally emphasize one mechanism 
through which past price behavior influences current price 
behavior. These are the two critical linkages in the present 
model. These two types of price studies provide a firm 
empirical foundation for the general form of the price deter­
mination mechanism employed here. 
One important element which has received little attention 
is the question of timing. Both unemployment rates and the 
history of price changes apparently are correlated with price 
changes. Which of these relationships dominates short term, 
say quarterly or monthly movements, and which is more long 
term in effect? Further what role is played by the postulated 
relationship between prices and actual versus expected levels 
of nominal income? These are the questions which will be 
investigated here. 
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Phillips studied the relationship between the rate of 
change of money wages and the level of unemployment. Building 
on this study, Lipsey observed a close correlation between the 
rate of change of money wages and the rate of price inflation 
as well as the level of unemployment. Friedman has suggested 
that the level of unemployment influences real wages, the 
movement of the money wage vis a vis the average level of 
prices. Most writers for the popular financial press as well 
as many cost-push theorists believe wage increases cause 
inflation. 
One suspects, ex ante, that there is some truth in each 
of these positions. An example exists to support, each of 
these positions; similarly, counter examples abound. 
In this attempt to investigate the way in which short 
term changes in nominal income are divided between changes in 
real output and changes in the price level it is necessary to 
investigate the relationship between wages, prices, and 
employment. It is hoped that some extensions to the Phillips 
approach may be suggested. 
It is of interest to begin with the relationship 
investigated by Lipsey. Recall the Lipsey results obtained 
with annual British economy data expressed in first central 
differences: 
W 0.47 + 0.43 (2.10) 
+ 11.18* -
(6.00) lu 
+ 0.038* [^1+ O.esfl^l (5.1) 
(.012) I" ; 
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A similar equation was fitted to quarterly U.S. data expressed 
in percentage rates of change with the following results. 
^ = 1.31* - 4.49*1^1 + 81.70* 
^ (0.44) (2.66)(35.78) U' 
0.027* 
(.0058) 
+ 0.69 
(0.12 
(5.2) 
d.w. = 2.33 Sj = 0.21 73 degrees of freedom 
Inclusion of lagged independent variables in various combina­
tions did not lower the mean square error and t tests on all 
lagged coefficients were uniformly nonsignificant. Estimation 
of this equation using the percentage change in weekly gross 
pay, w, instead of hourly wages gave similar results. 
^ = 3.15* -
^ (1.21) 
d.w. = 2.53 
14.24* 
(7.34) ik 157.71* (98.49) fl 1 A - 0.072 u (.015) ri + 0.78 (0.33 p i  (5.3) 
s: = 1.65 
e 
73 degrees of freedom 
From a theoretical standpoint these results are not 
appealing. In most Phillips-type studies the rate of price 
inflation is not introduced as a dependent variable. The 
usual inverse relationship between wages and unemployment 
then appears. Inclusion of this variable significantly alters 
the unemployment coefficients, however. The partial derivative 
of the equation with respect to the unemployment rate is 
slightly positive over normal ranges of U. However the 
estimated coefficient for the inflation variable is most 
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interesting. Clearly there exists a strong positive relation­
ship between wage and price changes. 
Adherents to cost-push theories of inflation might 
suggest that the roles played by wages and prices should be 
reversed in a regression such as this. This yields 
P' 
= -1.44* + 9.82 
(0.32) (1.78 N -
135.9* 
(24.17) 
1 
? 
+ 0.014* M + 0.41* (0.73) 
W 
W 
(5.4) 
d.w. = 1.24 = 0.13 
e 
73 degrees of freedom 
The low Durbin Watson statistic suggests the presence of first 
order auto correlation among the error terms. Estimation of 
the error structure by fitting the estimated vector of errors, 
e^, successively on ®t-l' ®t-2' ®t-3' so on..., suggests 
the presence of second order autocorrelated errors e^ = p^e^_^ 
+ P2®t-2 ^t* obtain unbiased estimators a second order 
correction for autocorrelation must be performed on the data. 
A simpler procedure is to insert two lagged dependent 
variables into the RfiS of the equation. The resulting 
estimators are biased in finite samples. However if the error 
terms from the resulting system are uncorrelated, the bias is 
on the order of 1/n where n is the sample size (see Johnston, 
1972, p. 304). For present purposes such bias falls within 
acceptable limits. The procedure offers the advantage of 
computational simplicity and a certain amount of intuitive 
appeal from the standpoint of economic theory. There is some 
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evidence to suggest that past increases in factor prices may 
be passed on to final consumers with some time lag and further 
that price expectations may play a major role in the process 
of price determination. To the extent that the lagged 
variables capture these tendencies explicitly their inclusion 
is defensible. Estimation by ordinary least squares gave the 
following results: 
P t = -1.08* + 0.22* (0.28) (0.11) 
-t-1 + 0 
(0.11) 
.18*fct-2 + 5.66* 
(1.61) U, 
- 89.25* 
(22.71) U. 
+ 0.013*f2/t 
(.004)1" 
+ 0.09 
(.063) 
W' 
w 
t-2 
d.w. = 1.93 
+ 0.27*l|'t 
(.067)'" 
+ 0.15* 
(.071) 
W 
W t-1 
(5.5) 
73 degrees of freedom 
Using weekly pay, w, as a proxy for wages yielded similar 
results. 
p« fpi 1 fni 1 fi"! 
I t = -0.94* + 0.38* I- t-1 + 0.28* ^  t-2 + 5.74* ~ 
^ (0.30) (0.10) J (0.10) J (1.72) t^tj 
- 72.95* 
(23.3) u; 
+ 0.012fS'tl + 0.082*fe'tl + 0.063*f%/t-ll 
(:005)l" J (0.029)1* J (0.027)1* J 
+ 0.024 
(0.025) 
(5.6) 
d.w. = 2.08 S% = 0.095 
e 
73 degrees of freedom 
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These results tend to lend moderate support to the cost-push 
thesis. Note here that the partial derivative with respect 
to unemployment is negative over normal unemployment ranges, 
the expected sign. Increases in the rate of wage inflation 
may be expected to lead on the average to a slight increase 
in the rate of price inflation ceteris paribus. The sum of 
the wage rate coefficients however is only .5 in Equation 5.5 -
a permanent one percent increase in wage inflation should 
yield a one half percent increase in price inflation. The 
impact using weekly pay rather than the hourly wage is 
considerably weaker. 
Equations of this type fit the data reasonably well. It 
is comforting to note the close relationship between wage and 
price changes. The relationship between the level of unemploy­
ment and the inflation rate in either form of the equation is 
of considerable theoretical interest» 
The role played by the unemployment rate is somewhat 
ambiguous. In equations of the type 5.2 and 5.3 one is 
tempted to argue along with Lipsey that it is an index of 
excess supply in the labor market. In equations of the second 
type, 5.4 and 5.5, it is apparently acting an an index of 
general economic activity - prices on average have tended to 
rise faster during booms than during recessions. Neither of 
these explanations is entirely satisfactory however. Further­
more the unemployment rate has a relatively small impact on 
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either wage or price inflation. For example summing the 
intercept and the terms containing U from Equation 5.5 yields 
0,01 for a 4% unemployment rate; -0.21 for a 6% rate. The 
average rate of price inflation is on the order of 0.72% per 
quarter. The unemployment rate is an important explanatory 
variable certainly; however it does not dominate the relation­
ship. 
Friedman (1968) has suggested in essence that this type 
of model is mis-specified, that the appropriate dependent 
variable is the rate of change of real wages and the proper 
independent variables are measures of excess supply in the 
labor market. Attempts to estimate such a relationship for 
quarterly data were not particularly successful. For example 
W p ' 
g - # = -0.52 + 3.27 
(0.73) (4.06) 
- 5.52 
(55.35) 
1 
7 
- 0.0048 
(.01) 
(5.7) 
No coefficients are significantly different from zero. Again 
introduction of lagged independent variables was of no help. 
Short term movements in real wages do not seem to be closely 
related to the level of unemployment over the sample period. 
These results are not surprising in light of the observed 
minor impact of the unemployment rate in preceding regressions. 
It seems quite reasonable that other market and institutional 
forces dominate such movements in real wages or that various 
random elements obscured the expected results. 
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There is a fundamental methodological difficulty with the 
approach taken thus far. The GNP Deflator is an index of 
final commodity prices; the wage rate series is an index of 
the price of a particular factor input. In a Neoclassical 
world we would expect output prices and factor prices to 
change in a more or less parallel fashion during a general 
inflation. Wages and prices should move together although the 
movements need not be proportional. High multiple correlations 
found in Equations 5.2 through 5.6 may largely be the result 
of spurious correlation. The point is that in the search for 
a theory of general inflation it is dangerous to rely too 
heavily on the observed correlation between wages and prices. 
In a sense the wage rate is just another price; perhaps there 
exists some force in the economy which causes all prices to 
change. 
In the search for such a causal factor it is tempting to 
assume the existence of a rather direct relationship between 
monetary movements and price changes. Such an impulse is 
well founded in the writings of all monetary theorists and 
has become a part of the conventional wisdom of economics. 
Indeed the thesis is well documented for cases of protracted 
hyper inflation (Cagan, 1956; Lerner, 1956; Patinkin, 1959). 
However hyperinflations are extraordinary phenomena, differing 
in many respects, one suspects, from the recent U.S. 
experience of more modest rates of price increase. 
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The thesis certainly cannot be substantiated by quarterly 
post war U.S. data. Regression by O.L.S. of the percentage 
rate of change of the Implicit Price Deflator on lagged price 
changes, unemployment, and the rate of change of money, 
narrowly defined, yielded the following results. 
t  =  - 0 . 5 2  +  0  
(0.66) (0.12) 
• 25* f|- t-11 + 0.26* 
(0.11) 
l't-2 
-  6 . 6 0  
( 9 . 7 7 )  U' 
+  0 . 0 3 3  
( 0 , 0 7 4 )  
Ml' 
MT +  0 . 0 0 5  ( 0 . 0 9 4 )  
+  5 . 7 6 * *  
( 4 . 8 5 )  I  U, 
+  0 . 0 4 7  
( 0 . 0 7 9 )  
d # w # — 2 # 0 3 s %  =  0 . 0 7 3  
e 
7 3  degrees of freedom 
( 5 . 8 )  
Regressions were also carried out using first central differ­
ences rather than percentage rates, using various lag and 
functional variations for the unemployment variable, and 
using a broader definition of the money stock, M2, rather 
than Ml. Qualitative results were uniform in all cases: 
strong positive correlations were observed with past rates of 
price change, weaker inverse correlations with the unemploy­
ment rate, and virtually no observable correlation with the 
monetary variable. 
The empirical evidence clearly does not lend support to 
the thesis that short term price movements can be appreciably 
influenced by monetary policy. 
144 
This does not suggest of course that money has no 
influence on the process of price level determination, but 
rather that the causal chain is somewhat more indirect and 
more complicated. 
The usual interpretation drawn from studies of the 
Phillips variety is that there exists a trade-off between low 
levels of wage inflation or price inflation on the one hand 
and low levels of unemployment on the other. Such an inter­
pretation is contradicted by periods of high employment and 
stable prices and by periods of high inflation and relatively 
high rates of unemployment, stagflation. 
The usual interpretation is incomplete. Consider the 
following proposition. The Phillips relationship should be 
plotted in three dimensions, not two: the rate of current 
inflation, the rate of unemployment, and the rate of inflation 
in the previous period. There exists for example an apparent 
trade-off between wage inflation and unemployment ceteris 
paribus - i.e. at any particular level of expected price 
inflation. But the range over which this mechanism operates 
at any point in time is determined by the immediate history 
of prices. Those who are surprised by the persistence of 
stagflation have apparently misinterpreted the statistical 
evidence. The phenomenon has existed in many South American 
countries for years, only in the U.S. is it new and 
disturbing. 
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The results of Equation 5.8 suggest a price adjustment 
mechanism similar to that proposed in Chapter II. A slightly 
modified form of that structure will now be tested directly. 
The price adjustment mechanism is defined by three 
difference equations in P and Y, see Equations A1 through A3 
of Appendix A. Note that as the learning factor elasticity E 
approaches one that the effect of lagged price and income 
expectations drop out of their respective equations, A1 and 
A2. The expectational equations then become 
IP. 
n = Pt-i t-i 
t-2 
^t = ?t-l 
t-1 
t-2 
(5.9) 
With this modification the restriction that expected prices, 
P*; enter into the price equation,- A3; with an exponential 
coefficient of one, the price equation to be tested becomes 
Pt 
"t-1 
EF EA 
r:-ij 
(5.10) 
This equation is log-linear and hence may be handled easily 
by least squares regression techniques, A proxy variable may 
be introduced as a measure of the ratio of actual income to 
normal full employment income. The variable used in the 
following tests was constructed from the labor unemployment 
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rate according to the following rule: 
"t Û 
^t ^ 100 100 
where Û is the average rate of unemployment over the sample 
period. This variable of course captures only the effects of 
labor employment; it would be desirable perhaps to include 
some component to capture the employment rate effects of 
other factors, say the capacity utilization index. However 
the purpose of this section is primarily that of demonstrating 
the plausibility of the proposed price adjustment mechanism 
while at the same time showing that the mechanism is consistent 
with the notions generally held by economists about the way in 
which prices are formed. Use here of the unemployment rate 
alone will adequately serve both these ends. 
The question of timing is central to an understanding of 
the workings of the proposed price mechanism. Economists 
today appear to be frustrated in their attempts to explain 
the simultaneous occurrence of both high rates of inflation 
and a high unemployment rate. This frustration may stem in 
part from an incomplete appreciation of the relative importance 
of the various factors which influence price changes and the 
timing of the effects of each of these factors — the nature 
of the structure of lags in the effects produced by each of 
these factors through time. 
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The hypothesis under investigation is that three factors 
combine to determine the price level at any point in time: 
(1) price expectations, or more generally the recent history 
of the general level of prices; (2) the relationship between 
the actual level of real output and what may be called the 
normal full employment level; and (3) the relationship between 
actual and expected levels of income. Since the third factor 
is of minor theoretical importance, in subsequent discussions 
it will be largely ignored. We will be concerned here with 
the questions of the relative importance and timing of the 
effects of each of these factors. 
Consider as a working hypothesis the following proposi­
tion : 
Prices over the near term, say over a period of the next 
few months, are largely dependent on the immediate history of 
price movements — factor cost increases will be routinely 
passed on with perhaps some lag, commodity demand is price 
inelastic in the short run, firms tend initially to adjust to 
changing economic conditions by varying employment and output 
not by changing price; over a longer horizon however the 
effects of other macro economic aggregates become manifest — 
it is only within the framework of this longer horizon that 
macro economic stabilization policy may be used to influence 
the mechanism through which aggregate prices are determined. 
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The most obvious way to test such a proposition would be 
to estimate a distributed lag function in the various 
variables by regression techniques. For example 
• K a. 
.i=o '-i. 
K 
n 
i=l 
fVi 1 ^i- ' k n 
[i=i 
K-il Yi" 
1 
(5.11) 
If it were discovered that the a^'s tended to be large and 
significant for recent time lags while the 3^ and weights 
were small but significant throughout the lag structure, the 
empirical evidence would generally support the thesis. 
As an exercise for the energetic student this approach 
was pursued extensively and unsuccessfully. The statistical 
problem is twofold. Of all the macro economic time series, 
those which measure aggregate price levels are the most well 
behaved» For any of the common price series the correlation 
between and P^_^ is extremely high. Any technique, then, 
which predicts future prices from past prices is extremely 
hard to improve upon. Similarly the lagged values of the full 
employment variable are highly correlated as are lags in the 
income expectation variable. 
Hence any attempt to estimate 5.11 is doomed by the 
extreme multicollinearity of the matrix of independent 
variables. The usual solution to multicollinearity problems 
is that of using a priori information to construct weighted 
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averages of the collinear variables. Such a procedure is 
clearly inappropriate when the principal question at issue is 
in fact the nature of that weighting structure. In an attempt 
to attack this issue while avoiding the multicollinearity 
problems which arise in distributed lag estimation a more 
roundabout technique was employed. 
In Equation 5.10 a relationship is proposed between 
prices in the current time period and other variables in 
preceding periods. No assumptions have been made however 
about the time duration of a particular period. Let j be the 
duration of one "period" in quarters. Equation 5.10 then 
becomes 
Ft ^t-lj 
EF 
Vli 
^^t-lj rt-ij. 
EA 
(5.12) 
where 
= P 
t-lj 
= Y 
t-lj 
Estimation of 5.12 for j = 1,2,3,... will provide some 
qualitative information about the timing relationships of the 
proposed price mechanism. A summary of such an exercise is 
contained in Table 5.1. The equations were first estimated 
by ordinary least squares and the first order residual auto­
correlation component, p, was obtained. The data was then 
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Table 5.1. Statistical estimates of Equation 5.12 parameters 
j EO EA EF P dw^ df^ 
1 1st pass .0001 
(.0004) 
-.015 
(.040) 
.0077 
(.038) 
—. 31* 2.64 89 
2nd pass .0001 
(.0003) 
-.009 
(.037) 
.010 
(.027) 
2.13 
2 1st pass .0007 
(.0006) 
-.052* 
(.029) 
.051 
(.060) 
.43* 1.15 86 
2nd pass .0008 
(.001) 
-.070* 
(.030) 
(.008) 
(.087) 
1.54 
3 1st pass .0014* 
(.0009) 
.011 
(.028) 
.148* 
(.087) 
.76* 0.62 83 
2nd pass .0014 
(.0022) 
-.026 
(.028) 
.204** 
(.143) 
1.62 
4 1st pass .0027* 
(.0011) 
.071* 
(.028) 
.296* 
(.111) 
.818* 0.37 80 
2nd pass .0043 
(.0035) 
.013 
(.027) 
.269** 
(.173) 
1.55 
Durbin Watson= 
^df; Total degrees of freedom. 
* 
Significant at 5%. 
** 
Significant at 10%. 
transformed and the system reestimated. An exponential scale 
EO factor of the form e was appended to the RHS of 5.12. 
These results are generally consistent with all important 
aspects of the working hypothesis proposed initially. It is 
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well known that current prices may be predicted with remarkable 
accuracy by examining past price behavior. If one wishes to 
predict prices one or two quarters into the future no further 
information is helpful. For longer projections relevant 
additional information is provided by the current unemployment 
rate. The income expectations variable apparently provides no 
useful information. Macro economic stabilization policy may 
be expected to exert its influence on prices only over a 
relatively long period. 
Note further that the impact of the level of employment 
upon prices is somewhat weak even where significant 
statistically. The estimated elasticity, EF, is 0.26 for the 
case where the time period under consideration is one year in 
duration. The variable clearly influences the process of 
price formation, but does not dominate it. Suppose, as a 
hypothetical example, that an extended period of rapidly 
rising aggregate demand coupled with a rapidly growing money 
stock combine to produce a high rate of inflation in an 
economy governed by a macro economic structure such as that 
proposed here. Suddenly government authorities become con­
cerned about this inflation and react with the sudden 
imposition of a tight fiscal and monetary policy. The 
immediate impact will be on real output and employment. 
Gradually the employment decline will have an impact on the 
price level mechanism; however it may be several quarters 
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before the impact is noticeable and many years before adjust­
ment is complete. 
It is the very weakness of the employment-to-price feed­
back loop which allows short run Keynesian models to ignore it. 
Yet over the long term these weak feedbacks add up, giving 
rise to the standard tenet of money neutrality held by the 
Monetarists. 
We now turn to the income equation of Chapter II. The 
proposed dynamic structure is recursive in nature. Prices at 
t are determined by the history of the system. Income is 
then determined jointly by exogenous demand, price, and the 
money stock. If the errors in the price equation are uncor-
related with errors in the income equation, ordinary least 
squares regression of income on prices and money should yield 
unbiased estimates of the coefficients. 
Equation A4 was estimated as a log-linear function. This 
yielded an estimate of first order autocorrelation of .95 in 
the error terms. It was decided therefore to estimate A4 as 
a linear function of the percentage rates of change in the 
respective variables, a technique nearly equivalent to a .95 
autocorrelation transformation with logarithmic variables. 
This form also emphasizes the "marginal", dynamic nature of 
the proposed relationship. All exogenous demand factors were 
ignored, their average effect is hopefully lumped into the 
intercept. To the extent that exogenous demand is correlated 
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with monetary or price movements these coefficients will be 
biased however. 
Ordinary least squares estimation yielded 
I't = 0.86* + 0.41*fl't] + 0.27*fe't] 
^ (0.23) (0.21)1^ J (0.09)1*^ J 
(5.13) 
d.w. = 1.14 p = .44* = 1.02 91 degrees of freedom 
The system was also estimated using the narrowly defined 
money stock. 
^ t = 1.06* + .49*11't Y' Y (.20) (.21) 
(5.14) 
d.w. =1.13 p = .44 Sg = 1.04 91 degrees of freedom 
By transforming the data using the estimates for first 
order autocorrelation improved efficiency estimators were 
obtained. 
f t = .92* + ,.44*0; t 
(.30) (.24) 
+ .23* 
(.10) g'4 
91 degrees of freedom d.w. = 1.84 S_ = 0.83 
e 
(5.15) 
I't = 1.18* + .41*f|'tl + .14*fe*t] 
^ (.25) (.24) (.07)1*1 J 
(5.16) 
d.w. = 1.87 = 0.84 
e 
91 degrees of freedom 
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As was mentioned previously, the legitimacy of this approach 
to recursive system estimation is dependent on the independence 
of the error terms in the price equation and the error terms of 
the income equation. Given the nature of the system in 
question it would be reasonable to expect some positive corre­
lation however. To avoid this possibility, price estimates 
from the price regression, P^, were used to construct an 
instrumental price variable for use in the income regression. 
V • fp ' ^ rMO • 1 
^ t = 1.30* - 0.18 Ix tl + 0.25|-rj| t| 
* (.20) (.15)[p J I 
2 d.w. =1.29 p = .36 Sg = .91 79 degrees of freedom 
The data was transformed for autocorrelation. 
I't = 1.24* + 0.186** 
d.w. = 1.83 = .78 
e 
(M +  0 . 2 0 *  M 2 ' .  M2 t 
Considering the level of oversimplification inherent in 
the construction of this test, the essential qualitative 
relationship between income, prices, and money is consistent 
with that proposed in the theoretical model. 
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CHAPTER VI 
Section A 
The principal weak link in contemporary macroeconomic 
analysis is the failure to integrate the relationships which 
determine the level of real output with the processes which 
determine the level of aggregate prices. Until recently 
analysis has not addressed the question of how changes in 
nominal income are divided between changes in real output and 
prices. Much of macroeconomic analysis focuses on questions 
of extremely short horizon in which this division question may 
be safely ignored. The discussion and formulation of policies 
which make claims to intertemporal optimal!ty cannot rely on 
such simplifications. 
All elements necessary for the formation of an integrated 
theory are part of the standard body of knowledge of macro 
analysis. Building on this foundation a model was constructed 
in which both prices and real output appear as endogenous 
variables. This model was shown to be consistent with the 
principal long run properties of the monetarist position (money 
neutrality, a monetary theory of the price level, real output 
consistent with Walrasian full employment); further the model 
displays the usual short run Keynesian properties (monetary 
movements affect the level of real output and interest rates, 
prices are sticky in the short run). In addition under 
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certain conditions the model displays several interesting 
cyclic properties : procyclic behavior of inflation rates, 
interest rates, and velocity. 
By making use of this model the problem of the formulation 
of monetary stabilization policy was treated as a topic in 
intertemporal dynamic optimization. Conceptually the problem 
was posed as a problem in optimal control theory. To avoid 
the computational difficulties of computing a general optimal 
feedback solution to the problem, an optimal monetary policy 
for several particular problems was located using an iterative 
dynamic programming algorithm. A cyclically varying exogenous 
demand factor was introduced into the model. It was shown 
that there exists an optimal control which results in normal 
full employment with no inflation throughout the cycle: this 
was termed the Golden Rule zero cost control path. Next 
control was allowed to deviate from this path during early 
phases of the cycle to allow analysis of the system with 
initial conditions not on the Golden Rule path. Optimal 
control with these initial conditions did not result in a zero 
cost path. However the optimal path ultimately converges 
toward the Golden Rule path, a turnpike property. Together 
these two exercises suggest the necessity for a symmetric 
cyclic damping control policy: it is necessary to persue a 
tight money policy during boom periods to allow policy to 
achieve both full employment and price stability objectives 
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during recessions. Finally the effect of persuing various 
interest rate objectives was considered. It was found that 
consideration of an interest rate stability objective in con­
junction with full employment and price stability objectives 
may significantly decrease the possibility of achieving the 
latter two goals. 
Section B 
The particular model developed in Chapter II was kept as 
simple as possible by intention. No permanent income effects 
were considered in the consumption equation. The investment 
equation ignores the distinction between the real rate of 
interest and the nominal market rate, and allows for no 
acceleration effects. Wealth and inflation effects were 
omitted from the money demand function. The money supply was 
assumed exogenous. There is no linkage between past levels of 
investment and the level of full employment output. These 
clearly are oversimplifications which could be remedied easily 
in a more complete model. 
Modifications of a more complex nature result from changes 
which extend the dimensionality of the model or introduce 
stochastic considerations. The present model is completely 
determined by some ten state variables plus two exogenous non-
controllable imputs and the exogenous control variable, the 
money stock. Extension of the price adjustment lags and 
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subdivision of consumption or investment demand into major 
components increases the number of state variables and hence 
the computational complexity of the system. The introduction 
of random elements requires reformulation of the objective 
function in expectational terras and treatment of stochastic 
differential equations. 
The dynamic programming solution algorithm, while 
providing a cheap and simple method for computing solutions to 
particular problems, does not provide a solution for the 
optimal feedback control rule necessary for day to day policy 
formulation. By extending the analysis somewhat further it 
should be possible to discover a rule of the form; if the 
state of the is at time t, and if estimates exist for 
exogenous demand and the full employment level of GNP, then 
* 
the optimal level of the money stock is M^. The present 
study demonstrates the gains to be made if optimal controls 
are employed. The feedback rule provides the necessary tools 
for specifying such a policy on a day to day basis. 
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APPENDIX A 
A Summary of the Dynamic Model 
Dynamic structure; 
n = n-i t-i 
t-2 
t-1 
EW 
{AD 
t-1 
t-2 
Vi 
EW 
(A2) 
^ = P*-l 
Yt = k 
Static structure: 
fVi 1 
EF 
fVil 
rt-ij kij 
< 
1! 
Ct + 
"t 
II 
-
P U 
C^ * ^t 
It = Bt • 
tê-= M! 
EA 
(A3) 
(A4) 
(A5) 
(A6) 
(A7) 
(A8) 
"t ' b* - \ 
, exogenous 
(A9) 
(AlO) 
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Full employment condition: 
Yf 
Yf. = _ ' (1 + RYf) • P. (All) 
^ ^t-1 
Boundary conditions : 
Fg' ^ 0' --1' ^ 0' ^ 0' ?-!' «0 given 
where : 
k = b • (1-b ) iti c 
t 
B = b_ • II { (1 + RBI.) (1 + RYf)}: exogenous demand 
t ^ i=l ^ 
X _ / -EM , 
Y = (-^ ) 
s + Y = 1 
6, Y > 0 
Principal Coefficients 
El : Interest elasticity of investment El < 0 
EM : Interest elasticity of velocity; hence (-EM) is the 
interest elasticity of money demand 
EW : Learning factor elasticities in the expectation functions 
EA : Income Accelerator learning factor in the price function 
EF : Employment Ratio impact elasticity in the price function 
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Parameter values used in simulation 
BC=0.9D0 
BI=45.D0 
BM=1.5D0 
EA=0.3D0 
EF=0.,5D0 
EI=-0.4D0 
EM=0.2D0 
EW=0.IDO 
M{1)=100.0DO 
NPASS=0 
P(1)=1.0D0 
PP(1)=1.0D0 
PP(2)=1.0D0 
PERP(1)=0.0 
PERPP(1)=0.0 
PERY{1)=0.0 
PERYP(1)=0.0 
RBI=0.0 
RYF=0.0 
YF(1)=216.338 
YP(1)=216.338 
YP(2)=YP(1)* (l.ODO+RYF) 
Variable Dictionary 
Y^ ; Gross National Product at nominal prices 
C. : Consumption demand; or more generally all income dependent 
demand components 
I. : Investment demand? or more generally all income 
^ independent demand components 
r^ Î The market rate of interest 
: Money demand 
; Money supply 
M^ : Money stock; exogenous 
P^ ; Price level 
P* : Anticipated price level; Computer Code PP 
Y* : Anticipated GNP; Computer Code YY 
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: Full Employment GNP at nominal prices 
y^ ; Real GNP, Y^/P^ 
y* ; Anticipated Real GNP 
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APPENDIX B 
Data Sources 
The money stock 
The monetary data used in this study were compiled from 
seasonally adjusted monthly data published regularly in the 
Federal Reserve Bulletin published by the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System. The various data time series 
were most recently revised and published in February 1973. 
Historical data back to 1952 was obtained from the revision; 
later data from subsequent issues. Quarterly series were 
constructed from simple averages of monthly data. The 
narrowly defined money stock, Ml, consists of (1) currency 
outside of the Treasury, Federal Reserve Banks, and vaults of 
all commercial banks; (2) demand deposits at all commercial 
banks other than those due to domestic commercial banks and 
the U.S. government; (3) foreign demand balances at Federal 
Reserve Banks; less (4) cash items in the process of col­
lection and Federal Reserve float. This corresponds to the 
Ml definition used by the Federal Reserve. The broad money 
stock definition, M2, employed consists of Ml plus all time 
deposits at commercial banks other than those due to domestic 
commercial banks and the U.S. government. This definition 
differs from that used by the Federal Reserve by the 
inclusion of large denomination negotiable Certificates of 
Deposit (over $100,000} held by large weekly reporting banks. 
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These C.D.'s have grown rapidly in recent years — from $10 
billion in 1969 to over $45 billion in 1974. They now 
constitute a major source of funds for the commercial banking 
system. 
Prices and output 
The Gross National Product series compiled by the Depart­
ment of Commerce was used as a measure of the total market 
value of final goods and services produced in a given time 
period. The series is estimated for quarterly periods, 
seasonally adjusted, and extrapolated to annual rates. A 
price-deflated series Gross National Product in Constant (1958) 
Dollars is also estimated by dividing broadly disaggregated 
components of GNP by their respective price indices. The 
implicit price deflator is simply the ratio of these two 
indices. The resulting ratio in principal takes the form of a 
Pasche index, _ _ . Hence comparison of seauential values 
^ ^0 t 
captures both the effects of price increases and changes in 
output composition. This is not a wholly undesirable 
characteristic however. Use of this index, furthermore, 
avoids some of the systematic bias found in both the Consumer 
Price Index and Wholesale Price Index. 
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The wage index 
Two proxies for average wages were used in this study. 
The first is an index of average hourly wages of production 
line workers in manufacturing establishments compiled by the 
Department of Labor and published in the Survey of Current 
Business. This index includes overtime and shift premiums. 
It is hoped that this provides an index of per unit output 
labor cost. The second is an index of average weekly gross 
earnings in manufacturing establishments. This too includes 
all premiums. It is hoped that this provides an index of 
"take home pay", at least in the percentage rate of change 
form. This series was constructed by multiplying the average 
wage by the length of the average work week. 
Monthly data was averaged to obtain a quarterly series; 
percentage rates of change were computed. This series was 
then regressed on quarterly dummy variables to obtain a 
seasonally adjusted series. 
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APPENDIX C 
Computer Program Listing 
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CALLING PBOGBAM FOB CHAPTER 4 SIMULATIONS 
REAL*8 TCOST(100,3) ,SIG (100) ,COST{100) ,BELL(100) 
REAL*8 Y (100) ,YP(100) ,P(100) ,PP(100) ,R (100) ,V (100) 
REAL*8 M (100) ,YF (100) 
REAL»8 PBRY(IOO) ,PERP(100) ,PERYP(100) ,PERPP(100) 
REAL*8 BC,BI,BM,EI,EM,EA,EW,EF,RM,RBI,RYF 
REAL»8 BB(IOO) 
REAL*8 ZETA,STPP 
COMMON YF,Y,YP,P,PP,R,V,M,PERY,PERP,PERYP,PERPP 
COMMON BC,BI,BM,EI,EM,EA,E*,EF,RM,RBI,RYF,NPASS,NN 
COMMON /AREAV TCOST,SIG,COST,BELL,ZETA,STPP 
COMMON /AREA2/ BB 
INITIALIZE VARIABLES 
NN=20 
BC=0.9D0 
BI=U5,D0 
BM=1.5D0 
EA=0.3D0 
2F=0.500 
EI=-0.4DO 
EM=0.2D0 
EH=0.1D0 
M(1)=100.ODO 
NpftS5=0 
P(1) = 1.0D0 
PP(1)=1.0D0 
PP (2) =1.0DO 
PP (3) =PP(2) 
PERP(1)=G.O 
PERPP(1)=0.0 
PERY(1) =0.0 
PERYP(1)=0.0 
RBI=0.0 
RYF=0.0 
STPP=O.OlDO 
YF (1) =216.338 
yp(1) =216. 338 
YP(2) =YP (1)*(1.0DO+RYF) 
YPC3) =YP (2) *(1.0D0+RYF) 
ZETA=1.D0 
COMPUTE TRIAL CONTROL FOR M 
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C 
CALL MGEN 
C 
C COMPOTE EXOGENOUS DEMAND CYCLE 
C 
CALL HOGS 
C 
C COMPOTE STATE TRAJECTORY 
C 
CALL Y34Y 
C 
C PRINT OUTPUT 
C 
CALL PRNTR 
C 
C COMPOTE COST PONCTION 
C 
CALL OBJ 
C 
C ITERATE THE DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING SOLUTION ROUTINE 
C 
700 DO 800 JP=1,5 
800 CALL QOAM 
CALL PRNTR 
IF (NPASS.LT.10) GOTO 700 
C 
C REDUCE STEPSIZE FOR CLOSER CONVERGENCE 
C 
STPP=0.005D0 
IF (NPASS.LT. 15) GOTO 700 
900 COrîTÎBÛB 
999 STOP 
END 
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SUBROUTINE Y30Y 
C 
C COMPUTE TIME PATH FOR COMPLETE DYNAMIC SYSTEM 
C 
C REQUIRES MONEY STOCK IMPUT AND PARAHETER INITIALIZATION 
C 
REAL*8 Y (100) ,YP (100) , P (100) , PP (100) , R (100) ,? ( 100) 
REALMS M (100) ,YF (100) 
REAL*8 PERY(IOO) ,PERP(100) , PERYP(IOO) ,PERPP(100) 
REAL*8 BC,BI,BM,EI,EM,EA,EW,EF,RM,RBI,RYF 
REAL»8 BB(IOO) 
COMMON YF,Y,YP,P,PP,R,V,M,PERY,PERP,PERYP,PERPP 
COMMON BC,BI,BM,EI,EM,EA,EW,EP,RM,RBI,RYF,NPASS,NN 
COMMON /AREA2/ BB 
DO 20 II=1;NN 
IP(II.LE.2)GOTO 10 
C 
C COMPUTE EXPECTED PRICE AND INCOME 
C 
C EXPECTATIONS ARE BASED ON PAST EXPECTATIONS 
C RATE OF INCREASE AND CORRECTED BY LEARNING FACTOR 
C 
PP (II) =PP (II- 1)**(1.ODO-EW) *P (II-1) **E**P (II-1 ) /P(II-2) 
YP(II) =IP(II-1) **(1.0D0-EW) *Y(II-1) **ER*Y (II-1) /Y (II-2) 
10 CONTINUE 
IF (lI.EQ, 1) GOTO 11 
C 
C COMPOTE PRICE LEVEL 
C 
C PRICES ARE A FUNCTION OF EXPECTED LEVELS 
C CORRECTED BY A LEARNING FACTOR 
C AND A % FULL EMPLOYMENT FACTOR 
C 
C YF IS FULL EMPLOYMENT LEVEL OF INCOME IN CURRENT PRICES 
C 
P(II) =PP (II) * (Y (II-1) /YF (II-1) ) **EF* (Y(II-1) /YP(II-I) ) 
YF(II)=YF(II-1) /P(II-1) *P(II)*(1.D0+RYF) 
11 CONTINUE 
C 
C COMPUTE NOMINAL INCOME 
C 
Y(II) = (M(II) *Ba) **(EI/(EI-EM))*((1.D0-BC)/(P(II) *BB(II) ) 
1**(EH/(EI-EM) ) 
C 
C COMPUTE COMPONENTS OF AGGREGATE DEMAND, R, V, ETC. 
C 
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V (II) =Y(II) /M (II) 
R (IT) = (Y (II) * (1.0D0-BC) / (P{II) *BB (11) ) ) *» (1.0DO/EI) 
IF(II.EQ.I) GOTO 20 
PER Y (II) =(Y(II)-Y(II-1) )/Y (II-1)*1 DO. DO 
PERP(II)= (P(II)-P(II-I) )/P(II-1)*100.D0 
PEPYP (11) = (YP (11) -YP {II-1) ) /YP (II-1) *100. DO 
PERPP (II) = (PP (II)-PP(II-1))/PP(II-1) *100.D0 
CONTINUE 
NPASS=NPASS+1 
RETURN 
END 
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SDBROOTINE QUàK 
C 
C 
C A MODIFIED GRADIENT DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING ALGORITHM 
C TO COMPUTE OPTIMAL CONTROLS FOB THE DYNAMIC SYSTEM 
C OF CHAPTER 2 FOB A PARTICOLAB COST FUNCTION 
C 
BEAL*8 TCOST( 100,3) ,SIG (100) ,COST(100) ,BELL(100) 
BEAL*8 Y (100) ,YP(100) ,P(100) ,PP (100) ,R (100) ,V (100) 
REAL*8 M (100) ,YF (100) 
BEAL*8 PEBY(IOO) ,PERP(100) ,PERYP(100) ,PEBPP(100) 
BEAL*8 BC,BI,BM,EI,EM,EA,E9,EF,EM,RBI,RYF 
REAL*8 BB(IOO) 
REAL*8 D,Z1,Z2 
BE&L*8 ZET&,STPP 
COMMON YF,Y,YP,P,PP,B,7,M,PEBY,PERP,PERYP,PERPP 
COMMON BC,BI,BM,EI,EM,EA,EW,EF,RH,aBI,RYF,NPASS,NN 
COMMON /AREA1/ TCOST,STG,COST,BELL;,ZETA, STPP 
COMMON /AREA2/ BB 
no 3 J=1,NN 
3 SIG(J)=O.ODO 
ND0=NN-2 
12 DO 30 J=1,15 
II=NN-J+1 
NK=2 
D=1.005D0 
C 
C COMPUTE TCQST FONCTIONS 
C 
15 M(II)=M(II) *D 
Y (II) = (M (II)*BM)** (EI/(EI-EM) )• ((1. DO-BC) /(P(II) •BB(II) ) 
1** (EM/(EI-EM) ) 
DO 20 K=1,2 
11=11+1 
IF (II. LE, 2) GOTO 10 
IF (II.GT.NN) GOTO 20 
C 
C COMPUTE EXPECTED PRICE AND INCOME 
C 
PP(II) =PP(II-1) **(1.0D0-Ee) *P(II-1) **EW*P(II-1)/P(II-2) 
YP(II) =YP(IT-1) **(1.0D0-EW) •Y(II-1) **EW*Y (II-I)/Y (II-2) 
10 CONTINOE 
IF (lI.EQ. 1) GOTO 11 
C COMPUTE PRICE LEVEL 
P (II) =PP (II) • (Y (II-I) /YF (II-I) ) *»EF« (Y (II-I) /YP(II-I) ) 
YF (II) =YF (II-I) /P(II-1) »P (II) *(1.D0+RYF) 
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11 CONTINUE 
COMPOTE NOMINAL INCOME 
Y (II) = (M (II) »BH) ** (El/(EI-EH) ) * ( ( 1.DO-BC) / (P (II)*BB (II) ) 
1**(EH/ (EI-EH)) 
20 CONTINUE 
11=11-2 
Z1=0.0 
22=0.ODO 
DO 21 JL=1,3 
IF((ÎÎ+JL-1).GT.NN) GOTO 21 
Z1= (100.D0» (Y (II+JL-1) -YF (II+JL-1) ) /YF (II' 7L-1)  ) ••2 + 21 
IF( (II + JL-2) .LT. 1) GOTO 21 
22= (100.DO» (P (II+JL-lî-P (II+JL-2) ) /P(II+JL-2)) **2+22 
21 CONTINUE 
TCOST (II,BK) =Zl + 22*ZETa 
M (II) =M (II) /D 
IF(!IK.EQ.3)GOTO 22 
IF (NK.EQ.1) GOTO 211 
NK=1 
D=1.D0 
GOTO 15 
211 D=0.995D0 
NK=3 
GOTO 15 
C 
C FIND SMALLEST TCOST 
C 
22 IF (TCOST (II,2).LT.TCOST (II,3)) GOTO 23 
ÎF (TCOSTCIIs 3) »Gl!^TCQST{II,1îî GOTO 2£i 
SIG {II)=-1.D0 
GOTO 25 
23 IF (TCOST (11,2) .GT. TCOST (II, 1) ) GOTO 24 
SIG (II)=1.D0 
GOTO 25 
2U SIG (II) =0.0 
25 CONTINUE 
IF (SIG (II)) 26,30,27 
26 CONTINUE 
27 CONTINUE 
C 
C MODIFY H (II) AS APPROPRIATE 
C 
29 H(II)=H(ÎI)*(1.D0 + SIG(II) *STPP) 
30 CONTINUE 
C 
C NO ATTEMPT IS MADE TO COMPUTE BEST STEPSIZE 
C ROUTINE HAY HOT CONVERGE IN NEIGHBORHOOD OF OPTIMAL PATH 
C HENCE A SMALL NOHBER OF ITERATIONS IS RECOMMENDED 
179 
C STEPSIZE, STPP, SHOULD BE REDUCED IN LATER ITERATIONS 
C 
WRITE (6,56) 
56 FORMAT ('0',' TCOST 1 TCOST 2 
1'TCOST 3 SIG SUBROUTINE 
WRITE (6,57) ((TC0ST(J,K),K=1,3),SIG(J),J=1,ND0) 
57 FORMAT (« » ,UP20.5) 
C 
C USING MODIFIED H, COMPUTE SYSTEM TRAJECTORY 
C 
CALL Y34Y 
C 
C COMPUTE VALUE OF COST FONCTION 
C 
CALL OBJ 
C 
C ALL ITERATIONS MUST BE CALLED FROH HAIR PROGRAM 
C 
RETURN 
END 
SENTRY 
